



MEMORANDUM

TO: HONORABLE MAYOR &
CITY COUNCIL

FROM: LeRonne L. Armstrong,
Chief of Police

SUBJECT: OPD 2021 Surveillance Technology
Annual Reports

DATE: July 15, 2022

City Administrator
Approval

Date Aug 18, 2022

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Oakland's Surveillance Technology Ordinance (which created Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) 9.64) requires that staff provide annual reports to the Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC) and City Council following the adoption of a Surveillance Use Policy for the particular technology. The City Council has now authorized the Use Policies for eight separate technologies utilized by OPD; a review of a ninth policy for automated license plate readers (ALPR) is still pending at the time of this report – an ALPR 2021 annual report was also provided for review by the PAC.

Each annual report (*see Attachment A*) covers multiple categories as required by OMC 9.64, such as technology description, how and where the technology was used, audit and data security, and community feedback; the "Information" section below provides information on each category. The PAC voted at the June 2, 2022 meeting to "approve" eight annual reports (and table the ALPR report). The PAC at their July 7, 2022 meeting voted not to "approve" but to "receive" the 2021 ALPR Annual Report. The Information Section below provides more information on the pending review of the ALPR Use Policy by the City Council.

INFORMATION

Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) 9.64.040: Surveillance Technology "Oversight following City Council approval" requires that for each approved surveillance technology item, city staff must present a written annual surveillance report for Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC) by April 30th of each year, or no later than one year after adoption of a Surveillance Use Policy. After review by the Privacy Advisory Commission, city staff shall submit the annual surveillance report to the City Council. The PAC shall recommend to the City Council that:

- The benefits to the community of the surveillance technology outweigh the costs and that civil liberties and civil rights are safeguarded.
- That use of the surveillance technology cease; or
- Propose modifications to the corresponding surveillance use policy that will resolve the concerns.

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The City has now adopted resolutions authorizing the Surveillance Use Policies of eight separate surveillance technologies.

- Cell-Site Simulator
- Forensic DNA (Crime Lab) Instrumentation
- Forensic Logic CopLink (database);
- GPS Tag Tracker
- ShotSpotter Gunshot Detection System
- Live Stream Camera Transmitter
- Mobile Fingerprint ID Scanner
- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Drone)

Additionally, OPD has provided a 2021 annual report for Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR). The PAC voted at the November 4, 2021 meeting to recommend a two-year moratorium against the use of the technology, as explained in the accompanying OPD ALPR 2021 Annual Report. However, the City Council has not as of the production of this memorandum reviewed a resolution to adopt the ALPR Use Policy or a resolution recognizing that the Chief of Police has certified the ceasing of use of ALPR by OPD¹. Therefore, ALPR is still considered an existing surveillance technology according to OMC 9.64.

Staff created annual reports for each of these nine surveillance technologies (*see Attachment A*). The reports cover the following categories:

- A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology;*
- B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s);*
- C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to;*
- D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year;*
- E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in*

¹ Staff prepared a report and resolution to either adopt the draft OPD ALPR Use Policy or a resolution in support of a two-year moratorium against ALPR usage. The report and resolutions were originally scheduled to the June 14, 2022 Public Safety Committee, then moved by the Rules Committee to the July 12, 2022 Public Safety Committee. The report and resolutions have since been scheduled to the September 13, 2022 Public Safety Committee by the Rules Committee with the cancellation of the July 12, 2022 Public Safety Committee.

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protecting civil rights and civil liberties. The analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology's use. The Privacy Advisory Commission may waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology's impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the City's administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data. If the Privacy Advisory Commission makes such a determination, written findings in support of the determination shall be included in the annual report submitted for City Council review;

- F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information;*
- G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response;*
- H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes;*
- I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates;*
- J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year; and*
- K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request.*

The annual reports were first provided to the PAC and scheduled to the April 7, 2022 PAC meeting; the PAC Chair tabled a review of the reports to the next month due to a full agenda. The reports were again tabled at the May 5, 2022 PAC meeting to the following month due to a full agenda. The PAC commissioners present at their June 2, 2022 meeting voted unanimously to "approve" and recommend to the City Council approval of eight of the surveillance technologies (except for the ALPR Use Policy)². The ALPR 2021 Annual Report was tabled to the July 7, 2022 PAC meeting.

The present³ PAC commissioners at the July 7, 2022 meeting voted to "receive" the ALPR 2021 Annual Report for City Council review.

The eight-surveillance technology annual reports where the PAC voted to "approve" and the ALPR Annual Report where the PAC voted to "receive" the report are all attached to this memorandum as **Attachment A**.

² The PAC Chair recused himself from a review of the 2021 ShotSpotter Annual Report.

³ The PAC Chair recused himself from a review of the 2021 ALPR Annual Report.

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For questions regarding this report, please contact Bruce Stoffmacher, Legislation and Privacy Manager at bstoffmacher@oaklandca.gov.

Respectfully submitted,



LeRonne L. Armstrong
Chief of Police
Oakland Police Department

Reviewed by:

Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief
Bureau of Investigations

Tracey Jones, Police Services Manager
OPD, Research and Planning Section

Prepared by:

Bruce Stoffmacher, Legislation & Privacy Manager
OPD, Research and Planning Section

Attachments (1)

A: OPD 2021 Annual Surveillance Technology Annual Reports



MEMORANDUM

TO: LeRonne L. Armstrong
Chief of Police

FROM: Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

SUBJECT: Automated License Plate Reader –
2021 Annual Report

DATE: March 22, 2022

Background

Oakland Police Department (OPD) ALPR Policy 430 (430.8 Agency Monitoring and Controls) states that the “ALPR Coordinator shall provide the Chief of Police and Public Safety Committee with an annual report for the previous 12-month period.” Policy 430 precedes City Council adoption of the Surveillance Technology Ordinance, enshrined in Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) 9.64; OMC 9.64 separately also requires annual reports as well as review and recommendation of a Surveillance Use Policy (SUP) and Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) – referred to collectively as “Privacy Policy.”

The following bullet points outline the history of OPD’s presentation of ALPR Privacy Policy documents to the City’s Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC):

- January 2019 - Presentation of draft ALPR Privacy Policy.
- February 2019 - Presentation of draft ALPR Privacy Policy.
- April 2019 - Presentation of draft ALPR Privacy Policy.
- January 2021 - Presentation of revised ALPR Privacy Policy and 2019 / 2020 Annual Reports.
- February 2021 - Presentation of revised ALPR Privacy Policy; PAC vote to recommend to the City Council that OPD be prohibited from using ALPR technology for two years.
- OPD then presented the ALPR Privacy Policy and 2019 / 2020 Annual Reports to the Public Safety Committee on May 11, and City Council on May 18. The City Council was presented with two options – OPD’s recommendation to approve the privacy policy as well as the PAC recommendation. The full City Council voted to send the Policy back to the PAC for further review and that OPD provide all missing information.
- August 2021 - Presentation of revised ALPR Privacy Policy and 2019 / 2020 Annual Reports.
- October 2021- Presentation of revised ALPR Privacy Policy and 2019 / 2020 Annual Reports; PAC commissioners suggest having an ad-hoc meeting but then confirm that there are not enough commissioners who are prepared to hold an ad-hoc meeting.
- November 2021- Presentation of revised ALPR Privacy Policy and 2019 / 2020 Annual Reports – at this meeting the PAC again votes to recommend a two-year moratorium OPD use of ALPR technology.

OPD is preparing to again present its Privacy Policy to the City’s Public Safety Committee along with the PAC November 2021 motion for a two-year moratorium at the time of the production of this report.

2021 Annual Report Details

- A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

Table 1 below shows the total scans and hits by month – the total license plate photographs made and stored each month (1,980,132 scans total for the year). Table 1 also shows the number of times the vehicle-based systems had a match (“hit”) with a California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) database (2,503 total for 2021). OPD’s very outdated ALPR system can only quantify these two figures; the system can no longer quantify individual queries or perform any audit functions, as the software is no longer supported from the original vendor. Prior, the system could run reports that detailed the reasons for queries (e.g. a type of criminal investigation). OPD can only provide more comprehensive use data if and when a newer ALPR system is acquired.

Table 1: 2021 OPD ALPR Scans and Hits

Month	Year	Scans	Hits
Jan	2021	198,027	235
Feb	2021	145,547	229
Mar	2021	212,367	238
Apr	2021	166,993	146
May	2021	184,147	235
Jun	2021	155,502	135
Jul	2021	98,814	110
Aug	2021	190,136	249
Sep	2021	221,509	375
Oct	2021	161,789	242
Nov	2021	121,565	143
Dec	2021	123,736	166
2021 Totals		1,980,132	2503

- B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had access to OPD ALPR data without following the standard data access request protocols outlined in Policy 430.9 “Releasing or Sharing ALPR Data;” OPD has provided this level of access because there is a Council-approved Safe Streets Task Force Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)¹. OPD believes that the Task Force MOU allowed for ALPR data-sharing with specific FBI agents who have been co-located with OPD in the Police Administration Building and worked on homicide cases. However, OPD personnel ran an audit of ALPR data queries and discovered that there were

¹ The mission of the FBI San Francisco Violent Crimes Safe Streets Task Force MOU is to identify and target for prosecution criminal enterprise groups and individual responsible for crimes of violence such as murder and aggravated assault, as well as other serious crimes. The MOU does not specifically address the sharing of ALPR data; however, the MOU does specifically articulate protocols for data sharing.

no queries from these FBI personnel. OPD has decided to revoke access to FBI these agents as of 9/28/2021 to alleviate concerns over data privacy.

OPD has not received requests for ALPR data in 2021 from outside police agencies.


- C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:

The ALPR cameras are installed upon fully marked OPD patrol vehicles (24 operational; 8 inoperable).

- D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year:

These vehicles are assigned to the Bureau of Field Operations I (administered out of the Police Administration Building in downtown Oakland) as well as Bureau of Field Operations II (administered from the Eastmont Substation). The vehicles are deployed throughout the City in a patrol function to allow for large areas of the City to have ALPR coverage as the patrol vehicles are used to respond to calls for police service; Figure 1 below is a map showing where patrol vehicles equipped with ALPR are generally deployed throughout the City.

Figure 1: ALPR-Equipped Patrol Vehicle Deployment Distribution



- E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties. The analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology's use. The Privacy Advisory Commission may waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology's impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the City's administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data. If the Privacy Advisory Commission makes such a determination, written findings in support of the determination shall be included in the annual report submitted for City Council review.

Members of the public have spoken at PAC meetings regarding concerns of negative impacts to privacy protections (e.g., that OPD could use ALPR server data to establish travel patterns of particular vehicles associated with particular license plates, and/or that ALPR data can be inadvertently released through inadequate privacy protocols). OPD has also heard comments that more advanced ALPR systems may be used to track other vehicle attributes (e.g., bumper stickers). More recently, OPD staff have also heard from members of the public in support of ALPR systems and wanting to be sure that OPD utilizes technology appropriately to support OPD investigations. Furthermore, OPD personnel are of media reports of ALPR systems where a lack of updates between local systems and State CA DOJ databases lead to inaccurate stolen vehicle notifications, which have led law enforcement to stopping motorists because of stolen vehicle notifications.

OPD is not able to provide the race of each person connected to each ALPR scan. Race data is not captured in the scan itself as explained in the ALPR Draft Surveillance Impact Report. Race data would only be captured if there is a related criminal investigation for a particular ALPR scan capture. Staff could attempt to connect each scan to the associated vehicle registration of each scanned license plate. However, staff would not know if the vehicle driver, at the time of the ALPR scan, is the same person as the registered owner of the vehicle. Furthermore, staff believes that the potential for greater invasiveness in capturing this data outweighs the public benefit of capturing the data. Staff therefore recommend that the PAC makes the determination, that the administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information as well as the associated potential for greater invasiveness in capturing such data outweighs the public benefit.

- F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information:

The current system is outdated, and the software is not supported from the original vendor. Prior to this loss in function, the system could be used to run reports for sample audits that detailed the reasons for queries (e.g., type of criminal investigation). The ALPR system can currently quantify only hit and scan data as noted in Part A above. OPD currently faces a “Catch-22” situation: OPD cannot produce audits and annual reports that meet the expectations of the Surveillance Technology Ordinance because its current ALPR database and software are outdated and only partially functional. OPD can update the system for approximately \$16,000 – but pursuant to the surveillance ordinance, OPD cannot update the system unless the City Council first approves OPD’s ALPR Use Policy. The PAC has cited OPD’s failure to produce audits and annual reports as a significant reason for the PAC’s refusal to support OPD’s Use Policy and its continued use of ALPR. Staff wants to comply with all facets of the City’s Surveillance Ordinance (OMC 9.64) and continue to bring annual reports to the PAC for ongoing independent oversight of this useful technology, but it cannot do so unless it upgrades its ALPR technology.

OPD created a new ALPR Training document in 2020; OPD staff audited the OPD online training and document review system to ensure that staff completed the ALPR Training module. Approximately 75% of staff have completed the training thus far and OPD is implementing directives to ensure 100% compliance.

- G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response:

The City’s Information Technology Department (ITD) confirmed to OPD that they have not detected any ALPR information breaches at the time of OPD’s inquiry for the production of this annual report.

- H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes.

Table 2 below provides 2021 Part 1 Crime Data. This data illustrates the high levels of both violent crime and property crimes that occur in Oakland including for the 2021 year

Table 2: 2021 OPD Type 1 Crime Data

Part 1 Crimes <i>All totals include attempts except homicides</i>	01-01-2020 through 12-31-2020	01-01-2021 through 12-31-2021	Year-to-Date % Change 2020 vs. 2021	3-Year Year-to-Date Average	YTD 2021 vs. 3-Year YTD Average
Homicide - 187(a)	102	124	22%	100	24%
• Homicide - all other *	7	10	43%	7	50%
Aggravated Assault	3,315	3,559	7%	3,206	11%
• With Firearm	499	599	20%	462	30%
Rape	217	158	-27%	193	-18%
Robbery	2,417	2,693	11%	2,641	2%
Burglary Total	8,689	10,197	17%	11,291	-10%
• Auto	6,221	8,179	31%	8,921	-8%
• Residential	1,247	1,055	-15%	1,370	-23%
• Commercial	958	670	-30%	750	-11%
• Other/Unknown	263	293	11%	249	18%
Motor Vehicle Theft	8,722	9,010	3%	8,071	12%
Larceny	5,974	6,186	4%	6,643	-7%
Arson	193	170	-12%	172	-1%
Total Part 1 Crimes	29,636	32,107	8%	32,324	-1%

Additionally, ALPR was used to recover 39 stolen vehicles recovered with a value an estimated value of \$227,337. **Appendix A** to this report provides additional information about stolen vehicles and/or vehicles involved in carjackings where ALPR played a notification and/or investigatory role.

- I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates:

OPD has received two new PRRs in 2021 related to ALPR; there were five total open ALPR-related PRRs as of December 31, 2021.

These requests related to the number of ALPR camera systems (see Section C above), ALPR data (the license plate number, date, time, and location information for each license plate recorded for related to either specific license plates or all captured data during certain time periods), and OPD emails related to ALPR data. Other requests related to the sharing of data with other agencies as outlined in Section B above. There are also PRRs relating to technology contracts.

For all ALPR PRRs, OPD can generally provide date and time information. OPD cannot provide information related to locations where license plates were photographed, nor information related to the specific vehicles. Some of these PRRs have been processed and

completed in 2022 during the time of the production of this report – status information below reflects recent updates made in 2022.

No.#	PRR#	Nature of Request	Status	Content Provided
1	<i>RT 16630</i>	<i>All records responsive to the below requests dated from January 1, 2014 through July 28, 2016. - The full documentation of all contracts or non-disclosure agreements (enacted OR IN EFFECT between the above dates) with the companies "Persistent Surveillance Systems" or "Vigilant Solutions" (more of request: https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/RT-16630).</i>	<i>Still being processed</i>	<i>n/a</i>
2	<i>18-649 –</i>	<i>The names of all agencies, organizations and entities with which the Oakland Police department shares Automatic License Plate Reader ("ALPR") data, such as the National Vehicle Location Service; * The names of all agencies and organizations from which the department receives ALPR data; * The names of all agencies and organizations from which the department shares "hot list" information; * The names of all agencies and organizations from which the department receives "hot list" information; more of request: https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/18-649</i>	<i>open</i>	<i>OPD ALPR Policy 430: https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/documents/618507/download</i>
3	<i>19-1546</i>	<i>How many automated license plate readers the Oakland Police Department has in use currently? Are they in fixed locations or on police cars, or other? How many vehicles on your hotlist currently? What's is the hit rate currently, and what was it in March 2018? How long is this data retained for? Is there a formal data retention limit? Have you shared any of this LPR data with any third parties, including non law enforcement bodies? If so, who? Have you bought license plate data from any third parties, and if so who? Has there been any communication between the department and representatives from</i>	<i>Open</i>	<i>Content not yet provided</i>

No.#	PRR#	Nature of Request	Status	Content Provided
		<i>or people acting on behalf of US Immigration and Customs enforcement and / or US Border Patrol? If so, please can you share all correspondence (inc attachments)? More information: https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-1546</i>		
4	21-6410	<i>Requesting ALPR Data for the last two years</i>	open	
5	21-6660	<i>Please provide me with an electronic copy (preferably PDF) of the guidelines and procedures referenced here in OPD's ALPR policy 430 enacted in 2016, including all amendments and revisions thereto: "The Bureau of Services Deputy Chief shall be the administrator of ALPR program, and shall be responsible for developing guidelines and procedures to comply with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq." Please provide records from the years 2016-2021.</i>	open	

J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year:

Zero; OPD did not incur any maintenance, licensing, or training costs. Training is completed using OPD's online portal as well as staff time.

K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request:

OPD and the PAC are developing and reviewing a new ALPR Surveillance Policy contemporaneous to the production of this report for OPD ALPR Use Policy 430. OPD is requesting PAC review and recommendation to City Council of this new Surveillance Use Policy (SUP). This new policy will cover all required areas of OMC 9.64.

OPD is committed to providing the best services to our community while being transparent and instilling procedural justice through daily police activity. This report is compliance with these OPD commitments. OPD hopes that this report helps to strengthen our trust within the Oakland community.

Respectfully submitted,

LeRonne L. Armstrong,
Chief of Police

Reviewed by,
Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

Carlo Beckman, Police Services Manager
OPD, Research and Planning Section

Prepared by:
Bruce Stoffmacher, Legislation and Privacy Manager
OPD, Research and Planning Section

David Pullen, Officer
OPD, IT Unit, Bureau of Services

Appendix A

ALPR Stolen or Carjacked Vehicle Data 2021

For all the examples below, officers performed necessary verification of the stolen vehicle status before acting.

1. 21-001682; 01/11/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 1600 block of 18th Street. The vehicle was unoccupied and reported carjacked by San Francisco PD. Vehicle was recovered and towed per SFPD's request. Age of data: ~6days
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2005 Ford F-150
2. 21-001802; 01/11/2021– Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 200 block of 19th Street. The vehicle was unoccupied and reported stolen by South San Francisco PD. Vehicle was recovered and towed per SSFPD's request. Age of data: ~2 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2000 Chevy Tahoe
3. 21-002447; 02/09/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 1100 block of E. 15th Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were unsuccessful, and the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~26 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 1990 Mazda 626 DX/LX
4. 20-056291; 01/17/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 1600 block of 8th Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were unsuccessful, and the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~14 months.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2000 Ford Focus
5. 21-002722; 01/18/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 1300 block of 5th Street. The vehicle was occupied, and officers attempted to detain the suspects, who fled. The vehicle was reported stolen by Berkeley PD. Age of data: ~2 days
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2016 Mazda CX5
6. 21-003887; 01/26/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 9700 block of B Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were unsuccessful, and the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~7 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2000 Honda CRV
7. 21-006106; 03/15/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit in the area of Fruitvale Ave & Foothill Blvd. The vehicle was occupied, and a stop was conducted. The driver was the registered owner of the vehicle and did not update OPD when they found and recovered the vehicle on 02/08/2021. The driver/registered owner was released. Vehicle was associated with strong-arm robbery, assault & battery, and kidnapping (initially of the victim). Age of data: ~1 month.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2003 Nissan Maxima
8. 21-006112; 02/08/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 3800 block of San Leandro Street. The vehicle was reported stolen out of San Leandro PD. The vehicle was unoccupied, and the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~10 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 1998 Nissan Frontier

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9. 21-006743; 02/17/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 250 block of 7th Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were successful, and the vehicle was released to them. Age of data: ~6 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 1999 Ford F-150
 10. 21-009814; 03/05/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 2800 block of 14th Avenue. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were successful, and the vehicle was released to a friend of the owner. Age of data: ~3 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 1991 Honda Civic
 11. 21-010933; 03/09/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 600 block of 6th Street. The vehicle was occupied, and the individual was detained and arrested. The vehicle was reported stolen out of San Francisco PD and was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~20 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2005 Ford Econoline E350
 12. 21-0111404; 03/13/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit in the area of 45th Ave and E. 12th Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were unsuccessful, and the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~1 day.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2006 Nissan Maxima
 13. 21-011572; 03/17/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 1300 block of E. 24th Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were successful, the vehicle was recovered and released to the owner. Age of data: ~4 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2000 Honda CRV
 14. 21-011654; 04/06/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 1600 block of Campbell Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were successful, but the vehicle was disabled, it was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~24 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 1994 Honda Civic
 15. 21-011750; 03/30/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 1700 block of Marin Way. The vehicle was occupied, and a stop was conducted, with one individual being arrested for auto-theft. Attempts to contact the owner were unsuccessful, the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~17 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2001 GMC Yukon
 16. 21-012745; 04/23/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 800 block of Chester Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were successful, and the vehicle was recovered and released to the owner. Age of data: ~1 month.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 1999 Honda Civic
 17. 21-014081; 03/28/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 700 block of Wood Street. The vehicle was unoccupied and reported stolen by Hayward PD. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~5 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 1998 Ford Econoline

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- 18.21-015106; 04/06/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 1600 block of 16th Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were unsuccessful, and the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~3 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 1989 Toyota Pickup
 - 19.21-026244; 06/10/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 1100 block of Chestnut Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were unsuccessful, and the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~2 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2003 Silver Nissan Altima
 - 20.21-017449; 04/20/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 3200 block of Wood Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were successful, the vehicle was recovered and released to the owner. Age of data: ~3 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2003 Chevy Silverado
 - 21.21-018211; 04/25/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 3300 block of Helen Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, recovered, and towed. Age of data: ~4 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 1997 Honda Civic
 - 22.21-018480; 04/23/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 1300 block of 5th Street. The vehicle was occupied, and a stop was initiated. An individual was detained and arrested. Attempts to contact the owner were unsuccessful, and the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~1 day.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 1993 Honda Civic
 - 23.21-020648; 05/08/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 2700 block of 10th Avenue. The vehicle was unoccupied and inoperable, the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~2 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2000 Honda Accord
 - 24.21-020912; 05/29/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 5500 block of Bancroft Avenue. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were unsuccessful, and the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~22 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 1995 Honda Odyssey
 - 25.21-035523; 07/31/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 2300 block of Embarcadero. The vehicle was moving and occupied, and a stop was conducted. Three suspects were detained with one being arrested for possession of a stolen vehicle. A stolen firearm was also recovered. The vehicle was recovered and released to the owner. Age of data: ~1 day.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2007 White Mercedes CLK
 - 26.21-025743; 06/12/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 550 block of 30th Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, recovered, and towed. Age of data: ~7 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2003 Mazda Protégé
 - 27.21-027162; 06/12/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit while on the 550 block of 34th Street. The vehicle was confirmed to be reported stolen by Berkeley PD. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were successful, the vehicle, however, was inoperable and was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~5 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 1997 Honda Accord

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- 28.21-027192; 06/12/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 550 block of 30th Street. The vehicle was confirmed to be reported stolen by Berkeley PD. The vehicle was unoccupied, recovered, and towed. Age of data: ~11 days
- a. Vehicle Data: 1997 Honda Civic
- 29.21-031826; 07/12/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit in the area of E. 15th Street and Miller Avenue. The vehicle was occupied and stopped with an individual being detained and arrested. Attempts to contact the owner were successful and the vehicle was recovered and released. Age of data: ~3 days.
- a. Vehicle Data: 1992 Toyota Previa
- 30.21-033234; 07/28/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 200 block of 11th Avenue. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were successful, and the vehicle was recovered and released to the owner. Age of data: ~11 days
- a. Vehicle Data: 2018 Volkswagen Tiguan
- 31.21-034757; 09/04/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit in the area of 30th Street and Telegraph Avenue. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were successful, and the vehicle was recovered and released to the owner. Age of data: ~1 month
- a. Vehicle Data: 1991 Honda Accord
- 32.21-036467; 08/23/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 1100 block of E. 15th Street. The vehicle (which was carjacked) was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were unsuccessful, and the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~18 days.
- a. Vehicle Data: 2015 Hyundai Veloster
- 33.21-037283; 08/10/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 1600 block of 62nd Avenue. The vehicle was reported as being carjacked by BART PD. The vehicle was unoccupied, recovered, and towed. Age of data: ~1 month
- a. Vehicle Data: 2008 Toyota Corolla
- 34.21-039386; 08/23/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 2200 block of Embarcadero. The vehicle was occupied and stopped with an individual being detained and arrested. Attempts to contact the owner were successful and the vehicle was recovered, but the owner did not show up and the vehicle was towed. Age of data: Recovered same day.
- a. Vehicle Data: 2002 Chevy Silverado 1500
- 35.21-040524; 08/29/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 3400 block of Elm Street. The vehicle was reported stolen out of Berkeley PD. The vehicle was unoccupied, inoperable, recovered, and towed. Age of data: ~5 days
- a. Vehicle Data: 2002 Dodge RAM 2500
- 36.21-044190; 09/20/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit in the area of 23rd Avenue and E. 11th Street. The vehicle was occupied and stopped with an individual being detained and arrested. The vehicle was reported stolen out of Emeryville PD. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~1 month
- a. Vehicle Data: 2011 Ford F150

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- 37.21-049102; 11/01/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 4000 block of Brookdale Avenue. The vehicle was unoccupied, attempts to contact the owner were unsuccessful, and the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: ~12 days
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2007 Chevy Express Van
 - 38.21-049863; 10/23/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 1200 block of 21st Avenue. The vehicle was reported stolen out of San Jose PD. The vehicle was occupied, and a stop was initiated, with two people being temporarily detained. An investigation discovered that the person who reported the vehicle stolen was not the registered owner and driver and passenger were released without further delay. Age of data: ~4 days
 - a. Vehicle Data: 2003 Toyota Corolla
 - 39.21-051300; 11/01/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 4700 block of Bancroft Avenue. The vehicle was reported stolen by the Alameda County Sheriff's Office, was unoccupied, recovered and towed. Age of data: ~5 days.
 - a. Vehicle Data: 1993 GMC Sierra

Non-Stolen Vehicle Cases


1. 21-012691; 03/19/2021 – ALPR was utilized to capture/scan license plates of vehicles participating in an illegal and unpermitted cabaret event party. Age of Data: Not Applicable
2. 21-012836; 03/20/2021 – ALPR was utilized by Pleasant Hill PD for a vehicle that was involved in an attempted murder. A stop was conducted, and an individual was detained and arrested. An illegal firearm was also recovered. Age of Data: ~6 days
3. 21-014039; 03/29/2021; – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 700 block of Walker Avenue. The vehicle was unoccupied, but the plate did not match the vehicle VIN it was attached to. The officer removed the plate and turned it into evidence. Age of data: 2 days.
4. 21-025695; 06/05/2021 – ALPR was utilized to search for a car that was suspected of being involved in a shooting. A warrant was obtained, and the individual was arrested. Age of data: ~1 month.
5. 21-031812; 07/09/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 7200 block of MacArthur Blvd for a vehicle involved in a robbery. The vehicle was occupied, a stop was attempted, and the suspects fled, eventually evading capture. Age of data: ~1 day.
6. 21-034075; 07/23/2021 – Officers on patrol had an ALPR hit on the 200 block of 29th Street. The vehicle was unoccupied, and the license plate was switched. The license plate was removed and attempts to contact the owner were unsuccessful. The license plate was remanded to evidence. Age of data: ~4 days.



Weekly ShotSpotter Activations Report — Citywide

14 Mar. – 21 Mar., 2022

ShotSpotter Activations	Weekly Total	YTD 2021	YTD 2022	YTD % Change 2021 vs. 2022
Citywide	162	2,091	2,003	-4%
Area 1	13	199	217	9%
Area 2	9	58	69	19%
Area 3	19	225	209	-7%
Area 4	36	327	352	8%
Area 5	40	722	575	-20%
Area 6	45	560	581	4%



All data sourced via ShotSpotter Insight.

Produced by the Oakland Police Dept. Crime Analysis Unit.



MEMORANDUM

TO: LeRonne Armstrong,
Chief of Police

FROM: Anwawn Jones, Sergeant
OPD, Intel Unit

SUBJECT: Cellular Site Simulator – 2021 Annual
Report

DATE: February 25, 2022

Background

Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) 9.64.040: Surveillance Technology “Oversight following City Council approval” requires that for each approved surveillance technology item, city staff must present a written annual surveillance report for Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC). After review by the Privacy Advisory Commission, city staff shall submit the annual surveillance report to the City Council. The PAC shall recommend to the City Council that:

- The benefits to the community of the surveillance technology outweigh the costs and that civil liberties and civil rights are safeguarded.
- That use of the surveillance technology cease; or
- Propose modifications to the corresponding surveillance use policy that will resolve the concerns.

Oakland Police Department (OPD) Department General Order (DGO) I-11: Cellular Site Simulator (CSS) Usage and Privacy, requires that OPD provide an annual report to the Chief of Police, the Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC), and Public Safety Committee. The information provided below is compliant these annual report requirements.

Sergeant Anwawn Jones is currently the CSS Program Coordinator.

2021 Data Points

- A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

The Cell Site Simulator Surveillance (CSS) Impact report explains that, “Cellular site simulators, as governed by this policy, function by transmitting as a cell tower. In response to the signals emitted by the simulator, cellular devices in the proximity of the simulator identify it as the most attractive cell tower in the area and thus transmit signals to the simulator that identify the device in the same way that they would a networked tower.

CSS receives signals and uses an industry standard unique identifying number assigned by a device manufacturer or cellular network provider to distinguish between incoming signals until the targeted device is located. Once the cellular site simulator identifies the specific cellular device for which it is looking, it will obtain the signaling information relating only to that particular phone, rejecting all others.

The authorized purposes for using CSS interception technology and for collecting information using that technology to:

- a. *Locate missing persons*
- b. *Locate at-risk individuals*
- c. *Locate victims of mass casualty incidents*
- d. *Assist in investigations involving danger to the life or physical safety of an individual*
- e. *Apprehend fugitives*

The technology was requested one time in 2021. The request was part of the investigation into the fugitives involved in the shooting of a retired OPD Captain. The Alameda District Attorney's Office approved the use. However, officers discovered the suspects prior to use of the technology.

- B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

DGO I-11 does provide that OPD may share CSS data with other law enforcement agencies that have a right to know and a need to know¹, such as an inspector with the District Attorney's Office. However, no CSS data would be downloaded, retained, or shared. No data was generated or shared with any agency because it was not actually used in 2021.

- C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:

CSS is not attached to fixed objects.

- D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year.

CSS was not utilized anywhere in the City in 2021.

- E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties. The analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology's use. The Privacy Advisory Commission may waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology's impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the City's administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential

¹ DGO I-11 explains that a right to know is the legal authority to receive information pursuant to a court order, statutory law, or case law.

greater invasiveness in capturing such data. If the Privacy Advisory Commission makes such a determination, written findings in support of the determination shall be included in the annual report submitted for City Council review.

Staff reached out to each City Council office to ask about possible community complaints or concerns related to this surveillance technology. No community complaints or concerns were communicated to staff.

In terms of “an analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology’s use”:

- *The technology was not used, and therefore there was no data generated from usage;*
- *OPD does have information about the suspect(s) connected to the case that precipitated the technology request. However, the phone related to the considered usage could have been in possession of other people. The phone also could have been registered by a different person and/or registered using a pseudonym contact.*

For the reasons cited above, staff recommends that the PAC waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology’s impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the possible inaccuracy of the information potentially gathered in this situation.

- F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information.

There were no uses in 2021 and thus no need for any audits. There were no policy violations.

- G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response.

There were no uses in 2021 and thus no possible data breaches.

- H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes.

Table 1 below provides 2021 Part 1 Crime Data. This data illustrates the high levels of both violent crime and property crimes that occur in Oakland including for the 2021 year.

Table 1: 2021 OPD Type 1 Crime Data

Part 1 Crimes <i>All totals include attempts except homicides</i>	01-01-2020 through 12-31-2020	01-01-2021 through 12-31-2021	Year-to-Date % Change 2020 vs. 2021	3-Year Year-to-Date Average	YTD 2021 vs. 3-Year YTD Average
Homicide - 187(a)	102	124	22%	100	24%
• Homicide - all other *	7	10	43%	7	50%
Aggravated Assault	3,315	3,559	7%	3,206	11%
• With Firearm	499	599	20%	462	30%
Rape	217	158	-27%	193	-18%
Robbery	2,417	2,693	11%	2,641	2%
Burglary Total	8,689	10,197	17%	11,291	-10%
• Auto	6,221	8,179	31%	8,921	-8%
• Residential	1,247	1,055	-15%	1,370	-23%
• Commercial	958	670	-30%	750	-11%
• Other/Unknown	263	293	11%	249	18%
Motor Vehicle Theft	8,722	9,010	3%	8,071	12%
Larceny	5,974	6,186	4%	6,643	-7%
Arson	193	170	-12%	172	-1%
Total Part 1 Crimes	29,636	32,107	8%	32,324	-1%

- I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates.

There are no existing or new public records request for the 2021 calendar year.

- J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year.

Zero (\$0.00). OPD did not incur any maintenance, licensing, or training costs.

OPD is committed to providing the best services to our community while being transparent and instilling procedural justice through daily police activity. This report is compliance with these OPD commitments. OPD hopes that this report helps to strengthen our trust within the Oakland community.

Respectfully submitted,

Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

Reviewed by,
Roland Holmgren, Captain
OPD, Violent Crimes Operations Center

Prepared by:
Anwawn Jones, Sergeant
OPD, Intel Unit

Bruce Stoffmacher, Legislation and Privacy Manager
OPD, Research and Planning Unit



MEMORANDUM

TO: LeRonne Armstrong,
Chief of Police

FROM: Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

SUBJECT: OPD Crime Lab Biometrics
DNA Analysis Technology
2021 Annual Report

DATE: March 11, 2022

Background

Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) 9.64.040: Surveillance Technology “Oversight following City Council approval” requires that for approved surveillance technology items (by the Privacy Advisory Commission per OMC 9.64.020 and by City Council per OMC 9.64.030), city staff must present a written annual surveillance report for Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC). After review by the PAC, city staff shall submit the annual report to the City Council. The PAC shall recommend to the City Council that:

- The benefits to the community of the surveillance technology outweigh the costs and that civil liberties and civil rights are safeguarded; or
- That use of the surveillance technology cease; or
- Propose modifications to the corresponding surveillance use policy that will resolve the concerns.

The PAC recommended City Council adoption of the “Oakland Police Department (OPD) Criminalistics Laboratory DNA Instrumentation and Analysis Software Biometric Technology Use Policy on October 1, 2020; following the PAC’s vote, the City Council adopted Resolution No. 88388 C.M.S. on December 1, 2020. This resolution approved OPD’s use of Criminalistics Laboratory DNA Instrumentation and Analysis Software Biometric Technology. OMC 9.64.040 requires that, after City Council approval of surveillance technology, OPD provide an annual report for PAC review before submitting to City Council. This report is intended to serve to comply with this mandate.

2021 Data Details

- A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

General Overview

The Oakland Police Department (OPD) Criminalistics Laboratory’s (Crime Lab) Forensic Biology/DNA unit utilizes specialized DNA collection and analysis instrumentation and software to perform forensic DNA testing. During this lengthy and complicated process, one step removes and purifies DNA from cells (digestion/extraction), another quantitates how much DNA is present and lastly, by amplifying and analyzing Short Tandem Repeats (STR) in the DNA using Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and separated by Capillary Electrophoresis (CE), forensic

DNA profiles are generated. Software is involved in the following processes: (i) collection and processing of STR DNA fragment data; (ii) interpretation of DNA data into DNA profiles used for comparison purposes. At the end of all processes, a determination can be made as to whether a DNA sample collected from a crime scene can be associated with a known individual through a comparison of evidentiary (crime scene) and known reference DNA profiles. Statistical weight is provided for all inclusion comparisons.

Specifics: How DNA testing was used in 2021

*The Forensic Biology Unit analyzed 430 (see **Attachment A for Case Record IDs**) requests between January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021. Over 2,300 items of evidence were examined, from which 5,278 samples were subjected to digestion and extraction using the Versa and EZ1 instruments. Scientist subjected 5,425 samples to quantitation analysis using the SpeedVac, Qiagility, and QuantStudio 5 instruments and 2,196 samples were subjected to amplification and typing methods using the ProFlex and 3500 instruments. The DNA profiles were processed with GMIDX or FaSTR and ArmedXpert software.*

- B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

Discovery to the Alameda County District Attorney's Office was provided in 29 cases. A standard discovery packet includes the reports, technical and administrative review sheets, case notes, attachments, contact log, resume, interpretation guidelines, photographs, electronic data, and any supporting documents.

- C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:

The Biometric Use Policy covers the specific technology covered. In general, the digestion, quantitation, normalization/amplification, typing, interpretation and databasing are housed in the laboratory of the Police Administration Building (PAB). Database equipment is located in a secure location elsewhere in the PAB as disclosed in the Use Policy. Currently, no equipment resides outside of these locations.

A cloud-based server location is under evaluation as a replacement for the server in the PAB. The details of this location and security would be handled under the auspices of the City of Oakland ITD policy and procedure and would meet or exceed industry standard for handling of secure servers.

- D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year:

All evidence was analyzed at the laboratory located in the PAB. No other locations are authorized. As for the geographic location of crimes, this is not collected by the laboratory in a way that can be disseminated easily. The address may be reported on the request for laboratory services form, but it is not required for analysis to proceed. The laboratory services crimes that occur in all areas of the City of Oakland.

- E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties. The analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology's use. The Privacy Advisory Commission may waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology's impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the City's administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data. If the Privacy Advisory Commission makes such a determination, written findings in support of the determination shall be included in the annual report submitted for City Council review:

Staff reached out to each City Council office to ask about possible community complaints or concerns related to this surveillance technology. No community complaints or concerns were communicated to staff.

The laboratory request for services form does not collect race information. It could be argued that requiring information that is not necessary for analysis, such as race, could be biasing; indeed, it would be a great invasion of privacy to capture this data since it is irrelevant to the analyses performed. Furthermore, the race of individuals subject to the DNA analysis technology's use is not revealed during evaluation of evidence as non-coding regions of DNA are typed and do not contain this information. Therefore, staff recommends that the PAC waive the requirement to identify the race of each person subject to the technology's use and make a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology's impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data.

- F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy (SUP), and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information:

All Forensic Biology personnel and relevant management were required to review and sign that they understood and would abide by the Surveillance Use Policy and the Impact Reports. Under accreditation, the Laboratory actively seeks feedback from its customers and no concerns were conveyed regarding violations or concerns around the SUP. Lastly, the Laboratory has a means to identify risks through Incident Response. Staff are encouraged to participate in Incident Response by filing Incident Alerts where there were concerns. No violations or potential violations were identified by any of these routes.

- G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response:

The laboratory maintains an active security program where the security of alarmed portions of the laboratory are tested and results recorded. There were no unexplained alarm events and there were no faults in the alarmed systems that were tested. There were no breaches to the laboratory nor to the equipment or databases that it houses. More importantly, there were no electronic data breaches in the laboratory.

- H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes:

The efficacy of the OPD Criminalistics Laboratory DNA analysis program is illustrated by citing the following compelling statistics:

The laboratory completed 430 requests in 2021. These are further broken out by crime type in Table 1 below

Table 1: OPD Crime Laboratory DNA Analysis Requests in 2021

Crime Type	Number of Requests
Homicide	92
Attempted Homicide	18
Cold Case Homicide	2
Suspicious Death	1
Rape	114
Other Sexual Assault (not rape)	57
Kidnapping	1
Assault	49
Robbery	29
Burglary	12
Carjacking	9
<i>Hit and run</i>	2
Auto Theft	1
Weapons	35
Other Person	4
Other Criminal	3
Officer Involved Shooting	1
Total	430

CODIS hits in 2021 – One hundred and twenty-four DNA profiles were uploaded to the CODIS database. The laboratory had one hundred and seventeen associations (hits); seventy-two hits to named individuals whose identity were unknown, seven hits to unsolved forensic cases, and thirty-eight hits to previously solved forensic cases.

Thus, forensic DNA analysis is an important tool to investigate and provide potential leads for a variety of crimes that occur in the City of Oakland.

I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates:

There were no public record requests for DNA analysis.

J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year:

Procurement of instruments is costly and is typically amortized over many budget cycles. Ongoing maintenance is imperative to ensure reliability of the instruments is remediated quickly should a problem occur. The reagents/kits and supplies to conduct testing are also steep. The cost / benefit analysis in the form of Return on Investment (ROI) calculations place the societal cost of each homicide at \$10,000,000 and a return seen of \$135¹ per dollar spent on violence reduction. Similarly, economic studies show that investigating sexual assaults results in \$81² saved per dollar spent.

The total costs of procuring and maintaining the equipment are shown by Category of testing and platform below:

Digestion/Extraction

- EZ1: \$63,000 to purchase (x3 instruments = \$189,000) and \$3,100 to maintain; 3 instruments for \$9,300 annual*
- Versa 1100: \$85,000 to purchase and \$6,800 to maintain*

DNA Quantitation

- Qiagility: \$33,100 to purchase (x3 instruments = \$99,300) and \$2,700 to maintain; 3 instruments for \$8,100*
- QuantStudio 5: \$57,000 to purchase (x2 instruments = \$114,000) and \$5,100 to maintain; 2 instruments for \$10,200*

DNA Normalization / Amplification

SpeedVac: \$4,000 to purchase, no maintenance

ProFlex Thermalcyclers: \$14,000 to purchase (x2 instruments = \$28,000), no maintenance

DNA Typing

3500: \$135,000 to purchase, \$6,000 to maintain

DNA Interpretation

STRmix: \$66,000 to upgrade, \$22,000 to maintain

FaSTR: \$37,000 to purchase, \$8,000 to maintain

ArmedExpert: \$15,000 to purchase

¹ Abt, Thomas (2019). Bleeding Out: The devastating consequences of urban violence—and a bold new plan for peace in the streets. Chapter 11, p. 208.

² Wang and Wein (2018) Journal of Forensic Sciences, Analyzing Approaches to the Backlog of Untested Sexual Assault Kits in the USA, July 2018, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 1110-1121.

The cost of testing reagents/kits was approximately \$131,000, however, this does not include consumables such as scalpels, masks, gloves, plastics, slides nor serological test kits.

Total purchase cost (born over several years): \$772,300

Total maintenance cost, 2021: \$70,400

Total testing cost reagents/kits, 2021: \$131,000

Estimate of consumables: \$140,000

K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request:

The instruments and software listed in the September 2020 Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) and Biometric Technology Use Policy (SUP) were not replaced during 2021. The laboratory did take some instruments and software out of service and replaced with technology platforms already included in the SIR and SUP (e.g. the Proflex and 3500 instruments).

For the current year, the laboratory is in the process of replacing the three Qiagen EZ1 robots (14 sample capacity) with two EZ2 robots. The EZ2 robot has a larger capacity (24 sample capacity) and will increase the number of samples processed in the same amount of time. The EZ2 robots were purchased with FY2020 Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction (CEBR) grant funds as declared in resolution 88358 for which purchase permission was granted; they are ordered, and the laboratory awaits shipment.

Later this year, when FY2021 CEBR grant funds become available, four cold storage units (freezer/refrigerator and refrigerator) will be replaced as declared in resolution 89011. The laboratory is also in the planning stages for STRmix software validation which has been disclosed in the existing SIR and SUP.

No new biometric capacities were added to the laboratory during 2021.

The laboratory is proposing a few changes to the current SUP and SIR 1) to reflect the technology that has been retired or replaced and 2) to add language codifying current OPD criminalistics laboratory practices which prevent improper use of victim profiles.

Edits in the SUP and SIR address retired or replaced technology.

Codification of Prevention of Improper use of Victim Profiles

In the past, the Forensic Biology unit QC database contained DNA profiles obtained from blood samples associated with homicides, suspicious circumstance deaths, and sexual assault cases. These blood samples were anonymized, assigned a QC source number and used as positive control samples for casework analysis. The purpose of using these QC samples was to show that the testing method or DNA typing process worked by verifying that expected results were obtained. This process was performed from 1996 to 2011. In 2012, the anonymized DNA profiles obtained from these samples was included in the QC database described above for the purpose of quality checks of backlogged or re-sampled

cases. The source of the profiles is unknown to crime lab line staff. They have never been, nor will they ever be, used for the identification of an individual in a criminal matter. Nevertheless, and in an abundance of caution, these QC samples were removed from the active database and archived in a location only accessible by FBU Supervisors. Additionally, language specifying that these profiles cannot be used for associations is proposed to be added to the SUP.

The Forensic Biology unit maintains an in-house Quality Control (QC) database. The QC database contains DNA profiles obtained from the following sources:

- 1. By consent from OPD staff (current and past) and their family members. OPD personnel that may enter the chain of custody for an evidence item or has other contact within the scope of the case,*
- 2. Samples provided by accredited proficiency test providers. The samples are anonymized by the test provider; the test providers are subject to strict confidentiality requirements by the accrediting bodies. The laboratory has no access to the source of these samples.*
- 3. The purpose and use of the QC database is twofold: 1) for casework quality control checks to ensure that the process worked correctly (positive control) and 2) to determine if there is possible contamination from a known individual to a casework sample. At this time, there are no victim references in the QC database. Such profiles have never been, nor are they allowed to be, used for the identification of an individual in a criminal matter.*

LeRonne Armstrong, Chief of Police

OPD Crime Lab Biometrics DNA Analysis Technology 2021 Annual Report

Date: March 11, 2022

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OPD is committed to providing the best services to our community while being transparent and instilling procedural justice through daily police activity. This report is compliance with these OPD commitments. OPD hopes that this report helps to strengthen our trust within the Oakland community.

For any questions with this report, please contact Dr. Sandra Sachs, Criminalistics Laboratory Manager, at ssachs@oaklandca.gov.

Respectfully submitted,

Reviewed by,
Drennon Lindsey,
Deputy Chief, Bureau of Investigations

Prepared by:
Sandra Sachs, PhD, Crime Lab Manager
OPD, Criminalistics Laboratory

Bonnie Cheng, Acting Forensic Biology Unit Supervisor
OPD, Criminalistics Laboratory

Bruce Stoffmacher, Privacy and Legislation Manager
OPD, Bureau of Services

Attachments (1)

A: Criminalistics Laboratory - Requests Completed Between 01 Jan 21 and 31 Dec 21



MEMORANDUM

TO: LeRonne L. Armstrong, Chief of Police
FROM: Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief
OPD, Bureau of Investigations
SUBJECT: Forensic Logic CopLink System – 2021 Annual Report
DATE: March 22, 2022

Background

Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) 9.64.040: Surveillance Technology “Oversight following City Council approval” requires that for each approved surveillance technology item, city staff must present a written annual surveillance report for Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC). After review by the Privacy Advisory Commission, city staff shall submit the annual surveillance report to the City Council. The PAC shall recommend to the City Council that:

- The benefits to the community of the surveillance technology outweigh the costs and that civil liberties and civil rights are safeguarded.
- That use of the surveillance technology cease; or
- Propose modifications to the corresponding surveillance use policy that will resolve the concerns.

Oakland Police Department (OPD) Department General Order (DGO) I-24: Forensic Logic CopLink, as well as OMC 9.64.040 together require that OPD provide an annual report to the Chief of Police, the Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC), and Public Safety Committee. The information provided below is compliant with these annual report requirements.

DGO I-24 explains that authorized members may use CopLink for the purpose of searching the system in the service of conducting criminal investigations, such as apprehending subjects, locating and returning stolen property, as well as in the protection of the law enforcement officers encountering the individuals described in the system. Authorized purposes also include other appropriate OPD organizational investigations (e.g., internal affairs, missing persons, and use of force investigations).

Captain Paul Figueroa, Criminal Investigations Division Commander, was the Program Coordinator for 2021.

A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

Forensic Logic search technology is used regularly by both OPD sworn field / patrol personnel and command staff. Search parameters include the following criteria which are submitted to a search engine where data originating from law enforcement records, calls for service, field interviews, arrest/booking records and citations are stored:

- *License plate numbers*

- *Persons of interest*
- *Locations*
- *Vehicle descriptions*
- *Incident numbers*
- *Offense descriptions/penal codes*
- *Geographic regions (e.g., Police Beats or Police Areas)*

Data is stored in an FBI Criminal Justice Information Service (CJIS) compliant repository in the Microsoft Azure GovCloud and encryption of data both at rest and in transit is protected by being compliant with FIPS 140-2.

In 2021, there were a total of 573 distinct users who conducted Forensic Logic searches, for a total of 498,267 separate queries. Table 1 below breaks down this search data by month and by distinct user and total searches.

Table 1: OPD CopLink Searches; by Distinct User and Search Totals

Search Type	January	February	March	April	May	June
<i>Number of OPD distinct users in each month</i>	345	352	345	359	365	366
<i>Number of searches conducted</i>	41,665	46,601	45,940	47,718	43,929	40,302

Search Type	July	August	September	October	November	December
<i>Number of OPD distinct users in each month</i>	342	336	342	334	313	307
<i>Number of searches conducted</i>	40,141	42,506	36,149	45,949	33,725	33,642

- B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

Data searched with the Forensic Logic CopLink system is entirely acquired from incident reports, citations, calls for service and field interviews that have already been recorded in originating Records Management Systems, Computer Aided Dispatch Systems, and Mobile Field Reporting Systems – from both OPD systems as well as from other law enforcement agency systems (other Forensic Logic client agencies). The data is collected from OPD systems at least once every 24 hours; once the data is collected and resides in the Forensic Logic cloud repository, it is made available to agencies subscribing to the Forensic Logic service who are permitted by their agency command staff to access CJIS information¹.

¹ Below is the warning message on the service user sign-on page that every user sees prior to accessing the system:

Data sourced from the Oakland Police Department cannot be accessed by US DHS ICE nor US DHS CBP staff.

- C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to.

The CopLink service is accessible by authorized OPD users on OPD computers with appropriate an user-id and password (criteria for both defined by FBI CJIS Security Addendum). OPD data sources that provide data accessible to the search tool include the following:

- *Arrest records*
- *Field contacts*
- *Incident reports*
- *Service calls*
- *Shots fired (ShotSpotter)*
- *Stop Data reports*
- *Traffic Accident reports*

- D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year:

CopLink software is not deployed in a manner as is physical hardware technology. The software is used by OPD personnel at the Police Administration Building, Eastmont Building, Communications Center, the Emergency Operations Center, (when active) and in patrol vehicles to search crime incidents and related data. The data itself can relate to crime data with geographic connections to anywhere in the City as well as the broader region and even nationally.

WARNING: You are accessing sensitive information including criminal records and related data governed by the FBI's Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) Security Policy. Use of this network provides us with your consent to monitor, record, and audit all network activity. Any misuse of this network and its data is subject to administrative and/or criminal charges. CJIS Security Policy does not allow the sharing of access or passwords to the Forensic Logic Coplink Network™. The data content of the Forensic Logic Coplink Network™ will not be considered for use as definitive probable cause for purposes of arrests, searches, seizures or any activity that would directly result in providing sworn testimony in any court by any participating agency. Information available in the Forensic Logic Coplink Network™ is not probable cause, but indicates that data, a report or other information exists in the Records Management System or other law enforcement, judicial or other information system of an identified participating agency or business.

In accordance with California Senate Bill 54, applicable federal, state or local law enforcement agencies shall not use any non-criminal history information contained within this database for immigration enforcement purposes. This restriction does not pertain to any information that is regarding a person's immigration or citizenship status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644.

- E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties. The analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology's use. The Privacy Advisory Commission may waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology's impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the City's administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data. If the Privacy Advisory Commission makes such a determination, written findings in support of the determination shall be included in the annual report submitted for City Council review.

Staff reached out to each City Council office to ask about possible community complaints or concerns related to this surveillance technology. No community complaints or concerns were communicated to staff.

OPD is not able to provide the race of each person connected to each CopLink query. There are thousands of queries and not all queries would provide race data of each suspect or person connected to each data result. Staff therefore recommend that the PAC makes the determination, that the administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information as well as the associated potential for greater invasiveness in capturing such data outweighs the public benefit.

- F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information:

Forensic Logic conducted an audit of OPD system queries to ensure all logins were conducted by existing OPD personnel

Forensic Logic is notified of additions or deletions to its subscription services by the designated Point of Contact at the Oakland Police Department. Forensic Logic also would modify the user census upon the request of any Chief of Police, Assistant Chief of Police or Deputy Chief of Police of the Oakland Police Department.

In addition, all Oakland Police Department users can only use Forensic Logic services from within OPD designated facilities such as the Police Administration Building, the Eastmont satellite location, the Communications Center, the Emergency Operations Center and from inside a patrol vehicle due to Forensic Logic's requirement that Internet Protocol (IP) addresses for users be whitelisted (be enabled for access). Any attempt to log in to the Forensic Logic services outside of those locations would fail by any person with an authorized OPD user id (email address).

In addition, on an annual basis, Forensic Logic will prepare a list of enabled OPD users for review by the OPD Point of Contact to confirm that all users should be enabled for access to the Forensic Logic services. Should individuals need to be removed from the services, the Point of Contact will notify Forensic Logic at that time.

- G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response.

Neither OPD, Oakland Information Technology Department, nor Forensic Logic are aware of any data breaches.

- H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes:

Table 1 below provides 2021 Part 1 Crime Data. This data illustrates the high levels of both violent crime and property crimes that occur in Oakland including for the 2021 year

Table 1: 2021 OPD Type 1 Crime Data

Part 1 Crimes <i>All totals include attempts except homicides</i>	01-01-2020 through 12-31-2020	01-01-2021 through 12-31-2021	Year-to-Date % Change 2020 vs. 2021	3-Year Year-to-Date Average	YTD 2021 vs. 3-Year YTD Average
Homicide - 187(a)	102	124	22%	100	24%
• Homicide - all other *	7	10	43%	7	50%
Aggravated Assault	3,315	3,559	7%	3,206	11%
• With Firearm	499	599	20%	462	30%
Rape	217	158	-27%	193	-18%
Robbery	2,417	2,693	11%	2,641	2%
Burglary Total	8,689	10,197	17%	11,291	-10%
• Auto	6,221	8,179	31%	8,921	-8%
• Residential	1,247	1,055	-15%	1,370	-23%
• Commercial	958	670	-30%	750	-11%
• Other/Unknown	263	293	11%	249	18%
Motor Vehicle Theft	8,722	9,010	3%	8,071	12%
Larceny	5,974	6,186	4%	6,643	-7%
Arson	193	170	-12%	172	-1%
Total Part 1 Crimes	29,636	32,107	8%	32,324	-1%

- I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates:

There are no existing or newly opened public records requests relating to Forensic Logic, CopLink, or LEAP (former name for CopLink).

- J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year:

Tables 2 and 3 below provides costing data from the current Oakland Forensic Logic contract.

Table 2: Oakland Forensic Logic Contract Cost; July 2020 - June, 2022

For the Period 07/01/2020 through 06/30/2022 payable upon execution of agreement:

Product Number	Description	List Price	Sales Price	Quantity	Subtotal	Discount (%)	Total Price
	CopLink SEARCH (07/01/20-06/30/21)	\$275	\$199	794	\$158,006	0%	\$158,006
	CopLink Analytics (07/01/20-06/30/21)	\$1,000	\$1,000	794	\$794,000	100%	\$0
	CopLink CONNECT (2 Years)	\$20,000	\$20,000	1	\$20,000	0%	\$20,000
	Integration Services NIBIN	\$5,000	\$5,000	1	\$5,000	0%	\$5,000
	Integration Services Motorola Premiere One CAD and RMS	\$25,000	\$25,000	1	\$25,000	0%	\$25,000
	CopLinkX (07/01/21-06/30/22)	\$275	\$275	794	\$218,350	0%	\$218,350
	Integration and Maintenance Services	\$25,000	\$25,000	1	\$25,000	0%	\$25,000
	Round down discount		(\$356)	1	(\$356)		(\$356)
						TOTAL	\$451,000

Table 3: Oakland Forensic Logic Contract Cost; July 2022 - June, 2023

For the Period 07/01/2022 through 06/30/2023 payable on July 1 2021:

Product Number	Description	List Price	Sales Price	Quantity	Subtotal	Discount (%)	Total Price
	CopLink SEARCH						
	CopLink Analytics						
	CopLink CONNECT	\$10,000	\$10,000	1	\$10,000	0%	\$10,000
	CopLinkX	\$275	\$275	794	\$218,350	0%	\$218,350
	Integration and Maintenance Services	\$25,000	\$25,000	1	\$25,000	0%	\$25,000
	Round down discount		(\$350)	1	(\$350)		(\$350)
						TOTAL	\$253,000

K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request:

No requests for changes at this time.

OPD is committed to providing the best services to our community while being transparent and instilling procedural justice through daily police activity. This report is compliance with these OPD commitments. OPD hopes that this report helps to strengthen our trust within the Oakland community.

Respectfully submitted,

Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief of Police
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

Reviewed by,
David Elzey, Captain
OPD, Criminal Investigations Division

Prepared by:
Bruce Stoffmacher, Legislation and Privacy Manager
OPD, Research and Planning Unit



MEMORANDUM

TO: LeRonne Armstrong,
Chief of Police

FROM: Robert Rosin
Acting Captain of Police

SUBJECT: Pursuit Mitigation System – 2021
Annual Report

DATE: February 22, 2022

Background

Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) 9.64.040: Surveillance Technology “Oversight following City Council approval” requires that for each approved surveillance technology item, city staff must present a written annual surveillance report for Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC). After review by the Privacy Advisory Commission, city staff shall submit the annual surveillance report to the City Council. The PAC shall recommend to the City Council that:

- The benefits to the community of the surveillance technology outweigh the costs and that civil liberties and civil rights are safeguarded.
- That use of the surveillance technology cease; or
- Propose modifications to the corresponding surveillance use policy that will resolve the concerns.

Oakland Police Department (OPD) Department General Order (DGO) I-22: Pursuit Mitigation System requires that OPD provide an annual report to the Chief of Police, the Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC), and Public Safety Committee. The information provided below is compliant with the annual report policy requirements of DGO I-22 as well as OMC 9.64.040.

Acting Captain Rosin, Bureau of Field Operations I, Area 2, is currently the Pursuit Mitigation System Coordinator.

DGO I-22 explains that “StarChase,” a private company, manufactures and supports its Pursuit Mitigation GPS Tag Tracking System. The “StarChase” system is a pursuit management technology that contains a miniature GPS tag and a launcher mounted in a police vehicle. The GPS Tag and Track Launcher System are comprised of a less-than-lethal, dual barrel GPS launcher which contains two GPS Tags (1 per barrel) mounted in the vehicle grille or on a push bumper. The launcher is equipped with compressed air and an eye-safe laser for assisting with targeting before launching the GPS Tag.

2021 Annual Report Details

- A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

GPS Tag technology was deployed one (1) time in 2021. On New Year’s Eve 2021, OPD received information of an armed caravan assembling in a West Oakland neighborhood. Plain clothes officers were dispatched to the area to investigate and make observations from a safe distance. A suspect vehicle from a previous armed caravan incident was observed. The vehicle left the area and separated from the

caravan. OPD personnel attempted a traffic stop, but the suspect vehicle evaded OPD patrol vehicles; no pursuit was initiated or authorized. Later, an OPD officer was able to position the patrol vehicle behind the suspect vehicle. OPD Command approved the deployment of the GPS Tag in order to assist in the safe apprehension of the suspect. One GPS Tag was launched at the rear of the vehicle but failed to affix properly and subsequently fell off the vehicle. There was no active tracking yielded from the GPS Tag deployment.

- B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

No GPS Tag data was generated from this one use.

- C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:

n/a

- D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year:

The technology was deployed on Interstate 80 near the city of Vallejo, outside of the City of Oakland.

- E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties. The analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology's use. The Privacy Advisory Commission may waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology's impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the City's administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data. If the Privacy Advisory Commission makes such a determination, written findings in support of the determination shall be included in the annual report submitted for City Council review

Staff reached out to each City Council office to ask about possible community complaints or concerns related to this surveillance technology. No community complaints or concerns were communicated to staff. The suspect connected to the vehicle where the GPS Tag Tracker was deployed was (one) male African American.

- F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information:

There were no audits as the technology was deployed only once, the use was in alignment with DGO I-22, and no data was generated.

- G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response:

There were no Pursuit Mitigation System technology data breaches as there was no data generated.

- H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes:

Table 1 below provides 2021 Part 1 Crime Data. The Crime Data report shows the high level of many types of Type 1 violent crimes occurring throughout the City. OPD uses surveillance technology to address this high level of crime.

Part 1 Crimes <i>All totals include attempts except homicides</i>	01-01-2020 through 12-31-2020	01-01-2021 through 12-31-2021	Year-to-Date % Change 2020 vs. 2021	3-Year Year-to-Date Average	YTD 2021 vs. 3-Year YTD Average
Homicide - 187(a)	102	124	22%	100	24%
• Homicide - all other *	7	10	43%	7	50%
Aggravated Assault	3,315	3,559	7%	3,206	11%
• With Firearm	499	599	20%	462	30%
Rape	217	158	-27%	193	-18%
Robbery	2,417	2,693	11%	2,641	2%
Burglary Total	8,689	10,197	17%	11,291	-10%
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• Residential	1,247	1,055	-15%	1,370	-23%
• Commercial	958	670	-30%	750	-11%
• Other/Unknown	263	293	11%	249	18%
Motor Vehicle Theft	8,722	9,010	3%	8,071	12%
Larceny	5,974	6,186	4%	6,643	-7%
Arson	193	170	-12%	172	-1%
Total Part 1 Crimes	29,636	32,107	8%	32,324	-1%

- I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates:

There were no public records requests (open or closed) related to GPS Tag technology in 2021.

- J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year:

OPD anticipates that the annual cost – once deployed – will be approximately \$30,000 annually for unlimited data and mapping service. This expense will be supported from OPD's database subscription account.

- K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request:

No requests for changes at this time.

While there was just one deployment of the GPS Tag system in 2021, OPD Command Staff has a plan to re-highlight the importance of the use of the GPS Tag technology as it relates to pursuit mitigation. The Training Section will produce a video which demonstrates the use of the GPS tag system and covers some of the relevant policy points which will help officers remember to request/use the technology during stressful enforcement action when split-second decisions are crucial. Additionally, OPD will move all vehicles equipped with the GPS Tag systems to the Patrol Division. Patrol Officers are engaged with more pursuits than other units because they have fewer resources available to follow and are more often responding to crimes in progress than special duty teams.

OPD is committed to providing the best services to our community while being transparent and instilling procedural justice through daily police activity. This report is compliance with these OPD commitments as well as the reporting requirements of OMC 9.64.040. OPD hopes that this report helps to strengthen our trust within the Oakland community.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert Rosin, Acting Captain
OPD, Bureau of Field Operations 1, Area 2

Reviewed by,
Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

Roland Holmgren, Captain
OPD, Violent Crime Operations Center

Prepared by:
Bruce Stoffmacher, Legislation and Privacy Manager
OPD, Research and Planning Section



MEMORANDUM

TO: LeRonne Armstrong,
Chief of Police

FROM: Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

SUBJECT: Mobile Fingerprint ID– 2021
Annual Report

DATE: March 15, 2022

Background

Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) 9.64.040: Surveillance Technology “Oversight following City Council approval” requires that for each approved surveillance technology item, city staff must present a written annual surveillance report for Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC). After review by the Privacy Advisory Commission, city staff shall submit the annual surveillance report to the City Council. The PAC shall recommend to the City Council that:

- The benefits to the community of the surveillance technology outweigh the costs and that civil liberties and civil rights are safeguarded.
- That use of the surveillance technology cease; or
- Propose modifications to the corresponding surveillance use policy that will resolve the concerns.

The City Council adopted Resolution 88095 C.M.S. on April 7, 2020 which approved the OPD Mobile ID Surveillance Use Policy as well as the Surveillance Impact Report.

OPD does not currently possess any Mobile Identification Devices (MID)s and there was zero (0) MID usage by OPD in 2021. The Alameda County Sheriff’s Office (ACSO), the lead sponsor of the MID program, is currently upgrading the devices with technology provider. OPD will appoint an internal MID Coordinator when OPD is able to receive and deploy upgraded units.

A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

The Surveillance Impact Report for the Mobile Identification Device MID explains that, “Mobile Identification Devices (MID) are small enough to be handheld, and contains an optical sensor to scan fingerprints and transmit them to look for matches within local databases MIDs are not investigative tools – they only allow personnel to attempt to match fingerprints of individuals who are to be arrested with possible matches from past arrests in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties.

The MID uses the Bluetooth radio standard to send a scanned image of a fingerprint to a police vehicle mobile data terminal (MDT), which can connect with special software. The software accesses a regional fingerprint database shared by Alameda and Contra Costa Sheriff’s Offices called Cogent Automated Fingerprint Identification System (CAFIS).

The sole purpose of the MID is to allow police to identify individuals who do not possess acceptable forms of identification (e.g. driver's license or passport) in cases where they otherwise do not need to be booked in the Alameda County Jail. State law requires police to identify individuals to be cited for an infraction or misdemeanor; arrest and booking into jail is legally required when an acceptable form of ID cannot be obtained. Police need to know who you are when a citation is appropriate."

OPD did not possess nor deploy MIDs in 2021.

- B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

There was no usage and no data generated in 2021.

- C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:

MIDs are not attached to any fixed objects.

- D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year:

OPD did not deploy MIDs anywhere in the City in 2021.

- E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties. The analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology's use. The Privacy Advisory Commission may waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology's impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the City's administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data. If the Privacy Advisory Commission makes such a determination, written findings in support of the determination shall be included in the annual report submitted for City Council review.

Staff reached out to each City Council office to ask about possible community complaints or concerns related to this surveillance technology. No community complaints or concerns were communicated to staff.

- F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information:

There was no usage of MIDs and no data or usage to audit.

- G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response:

There was no MID-related data generated and no data breaches.

- H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes:

Non applicable based on zero usage.

- I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates:

No public records requests related to MIDs in 2021.

- J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year:

There was no MID usage and no cost to OPD.

- K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request:

No requests for changes at this time.

OPD is committed to providing the best services to our community while being transparent and instilling procedural justice through daily police activity. This report is compliance with these OPD commitments. OPD hopes that this report helps to strengthen our trust within the Oakland community.

Respectfully submitted,

Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

Reviewed by,
Jeffrey Thomason, Lieutenant
OPD, Special Operations Section

Prepared by:
David Pullen, Officer
OPD, Bureau of Services, Information Technology Unit

Bruce Stoffmacher, Legislation and Privacy Manager
OPD, Research and Planning Unit



MEMORANDUM

TO: LeRonne Armstrong,
Chief of Police

FROM: Trevelyan Jones, Captain,
Ceasefire Section

SUBJECT: Gunshot Location Detection
System (ShotSpotter) – 2021
Annual Report

DATE: March 22, 2022

Background

Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) 9.64.040: Surveillance Technology “Oversight following City Council approval” requires that for each approved surveillance technology item, city staff must present a written annual surveillance report for Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC). After review by the Privacy Advisory Commission, city staff shall submit the annual surveillance report to the City Council. The PAC shall recommend to the City Council that:

- The benefits to the community of the surveillance technology outweigh the costs and that civil liberties and civil rights are safeguarded.
- That use of the surveillance technology cease; or
- Propose modifications to the corresponding surveillance use policy that will resolve the concerns.

The PAC recommended adoption of OPD Department General Order (DGO) I-20: “Gunshot Location Detection System” at their October 3, 2019 meeting; the report was presented to the City Council on November 19, 2019 and adopted by the City Council via Resolution No. 87937 C.M.S. DGO I-20 requires that OPD provide an annual report to the Chief of Police, the Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC), and the City Council.

2021 Data Details

- A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

From the “Surveillance Impact Use Report for the Gunshot Location Detection System:”

Part 1 – How the System Works: “The GLD system sensors are designed to detect gunshots based on their acoustic signature (e.g. broad-frequency, impulsiveness and loudness). The utilization of multiple sensors at different distances from a gunshot sound allows the system not only to capture the sound but assign a probability that it is a gunshot and triangulate its precise location based on time difference of arrival. If the machine classifier in the “ShotSpotter Cloud” determines it is likely a gunshot based on computer-learning algorithms, the system will pull a short audio snippet from the sensors that detected it and send it to human analysts at the ShotSpotter Incident Review Center at its headquarters in Newark, CA. The analysts perform an auditory and visual assessment of the audio waveform to make a final determination as part of a two-phased classification process. If confirmed as a gunshot, an alert is published containing

information such as street address, number of rounds fired, and a short audio snippet of the gunfire event– all within 60 seconds of the trigger pull (29 seconds on average).”

From Section 2: Proposed Purpose: “The purpose of GLD is to enable OPD to provide a higher level of the service to the community related to shootings. The system detects, locates and alerts officers of virtually all gunshots in a coverage area in less than 60 seconds enabling officers to respond to and investigate gunshots incidents they would not have known about and to respond to them much more rapidly than waiting for a 911 call. Personnel can better respond to gunshot activity and respond to possible armed individuals as well as to possible gunshot victims through this important real-time data.”

ShotSpotter technology was used in the following ways/with the following outcomes in 2021:

- *The number of times ShotSpotter technology was requested: ShotSpotter alerted OPD to 8,965 unique gunshot incidents from January 1 – December 31, 2021. Of those alerts, 8,922 (99%) were not called in by the community as a 415GS call type (shots fired), and OPD would not have known about them nor have been able to respond in a timely fashion. This information is based on an analysis of calls within 15 minutes and 300 feet of a ShotSpotter alert.*
- *ShotSpotter led police to 86 shooting victims when no one called 911, 10 of which were homicides and 76 were injured. OPD was able to provide and coordinate immediate emergency medical response to the 76 surviving shooting victims; OPD personnel believe that several of these victims survived the shootings specifically because of the quick response subsequent medical attention. In some instances, OPD and medical response occurred within less than two minutes of the ShotSpotter activation. The ShotSpotter alert was within 10 minutes and 1,000 feet of the location where the victim was found. Furthermore, staff believe that there were many more cases where OPD responded to activations and found shooting victims – and where critical medical attention was provided. The 86 cases cited here (76 injury cases) are the ones where OPD and ShotSpotter staff can conclusively cite the response to the ShotSpotter activations.*
- *ShotSpotter activations led OPD to 67 victims where their vehicle and/or dwelling was shot. Of these 67 victims, 28 victims were present but not hit by gunfire, and 39 were listed as victims because the property belonged to them.*
- *1,530 crime incident reports (17% of total activations)*
 - *1,108 (72%) of these incidents resulted in OPD Crime Lab requests for further firearm forensic analysis.*
- *ShotSpotter provided the following additional reports in relation to specific ShotSpotter activations:*
 - *Seventeen detailed forensic reports*
 - *Court preparation for eight cases*

B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

The following agencies have been provided log-in access to the ShotSpotter System for ongoing usage:

1. *OPD and the Oakland Housing Authority Police Department entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2012, following City Council approval, to fund the initial ShotSpotter program in areas of the City and near OHA buildings known for higher levels of gun shots. This MOU allows OPD to share access to the ShotSpotter cloud-based portal with OHA PD personnel.*
2. *Personnel from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) who participate in the Council-approved OPD-ATF Taskforce also have access to the ShotSpotter System.*

These agencies have ongoing log-in access and do not make written requests for access.

DGO I-20 Section B – 1. “Authorized Use” states:

The Chief of Police or designee shall provide necessary training and/or technical assistance for GLD usage. Only OPD personnel, authorized members of agencies working in contracted partnership with OPD, and members of agencies specifically designated for temporary authorization by the Chief of Police, shall be granted access to OPD’s GLD System. The Chief of Police may designate temporary authorization to utilize OPD’s GLD system to members of agencies working in partnership with OPD within the City of Oakland.

The California Highway Patrol (CHP) requested ShotSpotter access during the May Day event in 2021 when there were hundreds of people at large events in the downtown area. However, command approval was not granted in time for this request; ultimately, no access was granted.

Separate from ongoing login access, DGO I-20 provides rules for sharing ShotSpotter System data with outside agencies. Section C–3 of DGO I-20: “GUNSHOT LOCATION DETECTION SYSTEM” – “Releasing or Sharing GLD System Data,” states:

“GLD system data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies based on a need to know or a right to know, or as otherwise required by law, using the following procedures:

1. *The agency makes a written request for the ShotSpotter data that includes:*
 - a. *The name of the requesting agency.*
 - b. *The name of the individual making the request.*
 - c. *The need for obtaining the information.*
2. *The request is reviewed by the Bureau of Services Deputy Chief/ Deputy Director or designee and approved before the request is fulfilled.*
3. *The approved request is retained on file and shall be included in the annual report.*

OPD did not provide specific ShotSpotter data to outside law enforcement agencies in 2021. However, OPD investigators in the Criminal Investigations Division and or other sections of OPD such as the Ceasefire Section regularly communicate with personnel from other law enforcement agencies on interjurisdictional investigations; these forms of collaboration may involve discussions related to shootings where OPD became informed from ShotSpotter

activations. ShotSpotter activations many times may lead to evidence gathering (e.g., finding bullet casings); OPD may share information about evidence (e.g., that bullet casings were found in a particular area at a particular time).

- C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:

OPD has contracted with ShotSpotter to install GLD sensors in different areas (phases) in several parts of the city. The total coverage area for the current ShotSpotter system comprises 18.17 square miles or approximately 32 percent of the city land size (55.93). OPD has chosen to install the sensors in areas most prone to gunshots based upon historical data. Many areas in East and West Oakland now benefit from the GLD system.

Most sensors are placed approximately 30 feet above ground level to maximize sound triangulation to fixed structures (e.g., buildings); at this altitude, the sensors can only record limited street-level human voice sounds. Furthermore, ShotSpotter only retains the audio for one second prior to a gun shot, and one second after.

- D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year:

***Attachment A** to this report provides the geographic areas of the City of Oakland that comprise the three ShotSpotter “phases” or areas covered under the current OPD-ShotSpotter contract. These areas intersect with all five official OPD Police Areas with a focus on areas where gunfire has historically occurred with greater regularity. **Attachment B** to this report is a weekly public ShotSpotter Activation Report for the week of March 22-28, 2021; this later report highlights areas of Oakland where ShotSpotter alerts have most recently occurred.*

- E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology’s adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties. The analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology’s use. The Privacy Advisory Commission may waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology’s impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the City’s administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data. If the Privacy Advisory Commission makes such a determination, written findings in support of the determination shall be included in the annual report submitted for City Council review.

Staff reached out to each City Council office to ask about possible community complaints or concerns related to this surveillance technology. No community complaints or concerns were communicated to staff.

OPD is not able to provide the race of each person connected to each activation since shooting suspects are often unknown. Many times, there is data regarding the race of shooting victims or witnesses (may be self-reported); however, this data is not captured in the same system as ShotSpotter and the administrative burden (6,053 total 2021 activations) to constantly connect the two disparate datasets would overwhelm staff capacity. OPD therefore recommends that the PAC makes the determination, that the administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information as well as the associated potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data outweighs the benefit.

- F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information:

New officers and crime analysts are trained on the ShotSpotter System as part of police officer academies. Officers and analysts are provided direction that covers login, and how to use different views (e.g., time-period).

OPD officers have automatic access to ShotSpotter notifications when in patrol vehicles equipped with standard vehicle computers via the ShotSpotter Respond System. ShotSpotter creates a log for every sign-in to their system, which includes the level of access the user has (admin view or dispatch view, which is notification only). OPD and ShotSpotter has verified that for 2021, all users who logged into the system were authorized users.

Patrol Officers in vehicles and/or on mobile phones utilize the ShotSpotter Respond System. The Respond System pushes notifications to users – there is no interactivity functionality. Shotspotter can only audit logins for both the Respond and the Insight program. ShotSpotter and OPD staff have verified that all logins were associated with appropriate active employees. Staff regularly removes access from employee emails where staff separate from City employment.

- G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response.

Neither OPD, ShotSpotter, nor the city's IT Department are aware of any data breaches of ShotSpotter data or technology in 2021.

- H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes.

Table 1 below provides 2021 Part 1 Crime Data. This data illustrates the high levels of both violent crime and property crimes that occur in Oakland including for the 2021 year

Table 1: 2021 OPD Type 1 Crime Data

Part 1 Crimes <i>All totals include attempts except homicides</i>	01-01-2020 through 12-31-2020	01-01-2021 through 12-31-2021	Year-to-Date % Change 2020 vs. 2021	3-Year Year-to-Date Average	YTD 2021 vs. 3-Year YTD Average
Homicide - 187(a)	102	124	22%	100	24%
• Homicide - all other *	7	10	43%	7	50%
Aggravated Assault	3,315	3,559	7%	3,206	11%
• With Firearm	499	599	20%	462	30%
Rape	217	158	-27%	193	-18%
Robbery	2,417	2,693	11%	2,641	2%
Burglary Total	8,689	10,197	17%	11,291	-10%
• Auto	6,221	8,179	31%	8,921	-8%
• Residential	1,247	1,055	-15%	1,370	-23%
• Commercial	958	670	-30%	750	-11%
• Other/Unknown	263	293	11%	249	18%
Motor Vehicle Theft	8,722	9,010	3%	8,071	12%
Larceny	5,974	6,186	4%	6,643	-7%
Arson	193	170	-12%	172	-1%
Total Part 1 Crimes	29,636	32,107	8%	32,324	-1%

Table 2: ShotSpotter Activations Resulting in Incident Report for Firearm Crimes by Category in 2021

Cases by Firearm-Related Crime Type	No.
Homicide	27
Attempted Homicides	6
Assault with a Firearm	186
Shoot at an Occupied Home/Vehicle	93
Shoot at an Unoccupied Home/Vehicle	88
Negligent Discharge of a Firearm	1,076
Weapons Violations (including exhibit/draw)	11
Robbery with a Firearm	10
Other (non-firearm crime type)	29
Total Cases	1,530

Table 3: Firearm Recoveries in 2021 Connected to ShotSpotter Activations illustrate Guns Recovered

Firearm-Related Crime Type	No.
Homicide	15
Assault with a Firearm	31
Shoot at an Occupied Home/Vehicle	3
Shoot at an Unoccupied Home/Vehicle	1
Negligent Discharge of a Firearm	17
Weapons Violations (including exhibit/draw)	18
Battery	0
Oher (non-firearm related)	3
Total Cases	88

- 88 weapons seized.
 - Note: more than one firearm may be from the same incident.
- 700 incidents when advanced situational awareness was provided to responding patrol officers on their way to crime scenes in high danger situations that required specific approach tactics such as multiple shooters, high capacity or automatic weapons being used, and drive-by shootings.

Table 4: Cases Where ShotSpotter Notifications Resulted in Gunshot Victim Medical Support

Dispositions	Incidents
Murder	10
Assault Firearm	75
Attempted Murder	1
Total Cases	86

- I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates:

There are six existing and/or new (five current) public records requests (PRR) in 2021.

1. RT – 16562
2. RT – 20137
3. 18-4226
4. 19-3007
5. 21-6666
6. 21-7783

- J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year:

Total paid in 2021 was \$592,010 for 18.17 square miles of coverage. These fees encompass all services ShotSpotter currently provides to Oakland. There are no additional charges for meetings, reports, analysis and training. These funds come from OPD's General Purpose Fund.

- K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request:

No requests for policy changes at this time.

OPD is committed to providing the best services to our community while being transparent and instilling procedural justice through daily police activity. This report is compliance with these OPD commitments. OPD hopes that this report helps to strengthen our trust within the Oakland community.

For any questions with this report, please contact Trevelyan Jones, Captain, OPD, Ceasefire Section, at tjones@oaklandca.gov

Respectfully submitted,

Trevelyan Jones

Trevelyan Jones, Captain, OPD, Ceasefire Section

Reviewed by,
Drennon Lindsey,
Deputy Chief, Bureau of Investigations

Paul Figueroa, Captain
OPD, Criminal Investigations Division

Carlo Beckman, Police Services Manager
OPD, Research and Planning Section

Prepared by:
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OPD, Bureau of Services

Attachment A - Shot Spotter Coverage Areas

Phase I with red borders (Activated in 2006): 6.2 square miles

East Oakland: East of High Street to 106th Avenue

West Oakland: East of Highway 980 to Frontage Road

Phase II with blue borders (Activated in 2013): 6.4 square miles

East Oakland: West of High Street to Park Boulevard


North Oakland: North of Highway 580 to Alcatraz Avenue


Phase III with yellow borders (Activated in 2016): 2.78 square miles

Downtown Oakland: Jack London Square to about West MacArthur Boulevard

Cleveland Height area: East of Lake Merritt to Highway 580 & Park Boulevard

Maxwell Park: East of High Street to Highway 580 & Mills College







MEMORANDUM

TO: LeRonne Armstrong,
Chief of Police

FROM: Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief of Police
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

SUBJECT: Unmanned Aerial System (UAS
or Drone) – 2021 Annual Report

DATE: March 9, 2022

Background

Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) 9.64.040: Surveillance Technology “Oversight following City Council approval” requires that for each approved surveillance technology item, city staff must present a written annual surveillance report for Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC). After review by the Privacy Advisory Commission, city staff shall submit the annual surveillance report to the City Council. The PAC shall recommend to the City Council that:

- The benefits to the community of the surveillance technology outweigh the costs and that civil liberties and civil rights are safeguarded.
- That use of the surveillance technology cease; or
- Propose modifications to the corresponding surveillance use policy that will resolve the concerns.

The PAC voted unanimously to recommend City Council adoption of OPD’s Departmental General Order (DGO) I-25: Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Use Policy on May 14, 2020. The City Council adopted Resolution No. 88454 C.M.S. which approved OPD’s DGO I-25. OMC 9.64.040 requires that, after City Council approval, OPD provide an annual report to the Chief of Police, the Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC), and the City Council.

Lieutenant Daza-Quiroz is currently the UAS Program Coordinator.

2021 Data Points

- A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

From the “Surveillance Impact Use Report for the Unmanned Aerial System (UAS)”

An Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is an unmanned aircraft of any type that is capable of sustaining directed flight, whether preprogrammed or remotely controlled (commonly referred to as an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)), and all of the supporting or attached components designed for gathering information through imaging, recording, or any other means.

*UAS are controlled from a remote-control unit (similar to a tablet computer).
Wireless connectivity lets pilots view the UAV its surroundings from a birds-eye*

perspective. UAV pilots can leverage control unit applications to pre-program specific GPS coordinates and create an automated flight path for the drone.

UAS have cameras so the UAS pilot can view the aerial perspective. UAS proposed for use by OPD and/or the Alameda County Sheriff's Office use secure digital (SD) memory cards to record image and video data; SD cards can be removed from UAS after flights to input into a computer for evidence.

UAS technology was used in the following ways/with the following outcomes in 2021:

Fifty-One (52) uses. Currently, OPD has no ownership of UAS's. All deployments and missions are conducted by the Alameda County Sheriff's Office (ACSO) or neighboring agencies with UAS Programs. In 2021, ACSO, and San Leandro Police Department (SLPD) responded to OPD requests. ACSO at times monitors radio channels and will respond prior to being requested¹. However, all agencies will only deploy if requested by an OPD commander and if policy requirements are met. OPD ESU has created a spreadsheet to track and monitor outside agency deployments. Lt. O. Daza-Quiroz sent a department wide email mandating all commanders who deploy drones to author documentation, similar to the protocol for use of the Emergency Rescue / Armored Vehicles. This process has allowed for appropriate documentation.

Table 1 below details the deployments of ACSO Drones in 2021 in the City of Oakland

Table 1: 2021 ACSO OPD Drone Deployments

Incident Type	Number
Mass casualty incidents	0
Disaster management	0
Missing or lost persons	3
Hazardous material releases	1
Sideshow events	4
Rescue operations	1
Training	0
Barricaded suspects	13
Hostage situations	0
Armed suicidal persons	1
Arrest of armed and/or dangerous persons	21
Scene documentation for evidentiary or investigation value	7
Operational pre-planning	1
Service of high-risk search and arrest warrants	0
Exigent circumstances	0
Total	52

Additionally, there were six incidents where ACSO responded and did not deploy. Reasons noted for these 'non-deployments were: inclement weather and suspect(s) already detained prior to arrival.

¹ ACSO has access to OPD radio channels and can monitor; ACSO personnel at times can respond to a call for service.

B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

(52) Fifty-Two. Outside Law Enforcement Agencies have access to UAS technology, and both provides OPD with the recordings and stores the information in their logs per their respective policy requirements.

C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:

The technology was never installed upon fixed objects.

D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year

Table 2 below details the Police Areas where UAS were deployed in 2021.

Table 2: OPD UAS Deployment by Police Area

Deployment by Area	Total Deployments
Area 1	9
Area 2	5
Area 3	9
Area 4	8
Area 5	17
Citywide	4*
Total*	52

** There were four deployments for Sideshow which were not documented as a specific area; the sideshow activity involved moving vehicles and involved multiple police areas.*

E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties. The analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology's use. The Privacy Advisory Commission may waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology's impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the City's administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data. If the Privacy Advisory Commission makes such a determination, written findings in support of the determination shall be included in the annual report submitted for City Council review

Staff reached out to each City Council office to ask about possible community complaints or concerns related to this surveillance technology. No community complaints or concerns were communicated to staff.

Table 3 below provides race data related to 2021 UAS deployments.

Table 3: Race of Detainees Connected to OPD UAS Deployments in 2021

	Race – Female	Race - Male	Total
Black	2	18	20
Hispanic	0	5	5
Asian	2	1	3
White	1	1	2
Other	0	1	1
Total			31

OPD knows the race of detainees connected to UAS deployments. However, the race of individuals involved in many UAS deployments is not known. There are cases such as barricaded suspects, where no suspect is ever discovered or detained. There could also be UAS uses for missing persons where the person’s identity is not entirely known nor discovered.

- F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information

The OPD Electronic Surveillance Unit (ESU) maintained a list of all UAS deployment logs for record and tracking purposes. This list was reviewed periodically for accuracy and for assessment of any policy violations. All OPD commanders were directed to send communications to ESU for any UAS request or use – similar to OPD protocols for use of Emergency Rescue / Armored Vehicles. No policy violations were found, and no corrective actions were warranted nor needed in 2021.

- G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response.

OPD is not aware of any data breaches; ACSO has confirmed that they have not discovered any data breaches

- H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes.

Table 4 below provides 2021 Part 1 Crime Data. This data illustrates the high levels of both violent crime and property crimes that occur in Oakland including for the 2021 year. UAS deployments connect to this citywide data in several ways. For example, barricaded suspect incidents are related to several types of crimes listed below. Similarly, arrest of

armed and dangerous suspects, and crime scene documentation also relate to this citywide crime data.

Table 4: 2021 OPD Type 1 Crime Data

Part 1 Crimes <i>All totals include attempts except homicides</i>	01-01-2020 through 12-31-2020	01-01-2021 through 12-31-2021	Year-to-Date % Change 2020 vs. 2021	3-Year Year-to-Date Average	YTD 2021 vs. 3-Year YTD Average
Homicide - 187(a)	102	124	22%	100	24%
• Homicide - all other *	7	10	43%	7	50%
Aggravated Assault	3,315	3,559	7%	3,206	11%
• With Firearm	499	599	20%	462	30%
Rape	217	158	-27%	193	-18%
Robbery	2,417	2,693	11%	2,641	2%
Burglary Total	8,689	10,197	17%	11,291	-10%
• Auto	6,221	8,179	31%	8,921	-8%
• Residential	1,247	1,055	-15%	1,370	-23%
• Commercial	958	670	-30%	750	-11%
• Other/Unknown	263	293	11%	249	18%
Motor Vehicle Theft	8,722	9,010	3%	8,071	12%
Larceny	5,974	6,186	4%	6,643	-7%
Arson	193	170	-12%	172	-1%
Total Part 1 Crimes	29,636	32,107	8%	32,324	-1%

- I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates.

There were two public records requests (PRR) opened in 2020 that have not been closed as of December 31, 2021, relating to drones:

- 20-3056; and
- 20-6466.

OPD's Records Division is still processing these two PRRs in 2021 and into 2022 because the full information request in each case is very broad and extends beyond the one technology or specific uses.

- J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year

(\$0.00) Zero. OPD did not incur any maintenance, licensing, or training costs.

- K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request.

No requests for policy changes at this time.

LeRonne Armstrong, Chief of Police

Unmanned Aerial System (UAS or Drone) – 2021 Annual Report

Date: March 9, 2022

OPD is committed to providing the best services to our community while being transparent and instilling procedural justice through daily police activity. This report is compliance with these OPD commitments. OPD hopes that this report helps to strengthen our trust within the Oakland community.

Respectfully submitted,

Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

Reviewed by,
Jeff Thomason, Lieutenant
OPD, Support Operations Section

Prepared by:
Omar Daza Quiroz, Lieutenant
OPD, Electronic Support Unit (ESU)

Bruce Stoffmacher, Legislation and Privacy Manager
OPD, Research and Planning Unit



MEMORANDUM

TO: LeRonne Armstrong,
Chief of Police

FROM: Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

SUBJECT: Live stream transmitter– 2021
Annual Report

DATE: March 15, 2022

Background

Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) 9.64.040: Surveillance Technology “Oversight following City Council approval” requires that for each approved surveillance technology item, city staff must present a written annual surveillance report for Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC). After review by the Privacy Advisory Commission, city staff shall submit the annual surveillance report to the City Council. The PAC shall recommend to the City Council that:

- The benefits to the community of the surveillance technology outweigh the costs and that civil liberties and civil rights are safeguarded.
- That use of the surveillance technology cease; or
- Propose modifications to the corresponding surveillance use policy that will resolve the concerns.

Oakland Police Department (OPD) I-23: Live Stream Transmitter Use Policy governs OPD’s use of Live Stream Transmitters; the policy was approved by the City Council on April 21, 2020 through Resolution No. 88099 C.M.S., as well as OMC 9.64.040, requires that OPD provide an annual report to the Chief of Police, the Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC), and the City Council. The information provided below is compliant with the annual report policy requirements of OMC 9.64.040 and DGO I-23.

Sergeant Inez Ramirez is currently the Live Stream / Video Team Program Coordinator.

- A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

*OPD used the livestream transmitter technology one time in 2021. **Attachment A** to this report provides the detail from the required after-action report provided to the City’s Privacy Advisory Commission (PAC) as well as the City’s Chief Privacy Officer. From page one of the report:*

“The City of Oakland activated its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) on May 1, 2021 and, as part of the City’s Incident Command System response, OPD staffed the EOC positions therein including the role of OPD Operations Incident Command. The activation and associated operations were necessitated by the plan to address planned but unpermitted crowd management events associated to “May Day” parades, marches, rallies, demonstrations, protests and May 1st events. Although OPD deployed video teams with EOC video stream transmitters during the entire operational period, the technology use was

Privacy Advisory Commission
April 7, 2022

limited to evening and late evening hours to better assess, plan, direct, and respond to circumstances associated with a march of approximately 70 persons.”

- B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

DGO I-11 does provide that OPD may share live stream data with other law enforcement agencies that have a right to know and a need to know¹, such as an inspector with the District Attorney’s Office. However, no live stream data was downloaded, retained, or shared with different agencies. Video was streamed into the EOC/DOC. Any supporting agency inside the EOC would have viewed the live stream. No live stream video was saved/downloaded at the EOC/DOC. No live stream video was shared with other law enforcement agency, unless they viewed it live on the screen at the EOC/DOC. No one is allowed at the EOC without:

- 1. Authorization*
- 2. Verification of their status, department, rank, and title*
- 3. All verifications are documented by OPD and or City Administration.*

- C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:

The transmitters are attached to video cameras which are handheld by officers monitoring the events.

- D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year:

The live stream transmitters were deployed in areas where the protests and marches occurred in parts of downtown Oakland.

- E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology’s adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties. The analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology’s use. The Privacy Advisory Commission may waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology’s impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the City’s administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data. If the Privacy Advisory Commission makes such a determination, written findings in support of the determination shall be included in the annual report submitted for City Council review.

¹ DGO I-23 explains that a right to know is the legal authority to receive information pursuant to a court order, statutory law, or case law

Staff reached out to each City Council office to ask about possible community complaints or concerns related to this surveillance technology. No community complaints or concerns were communicated to staff.

OPD did notify the City's Chief Privacy Officer and Chair and Co-Chair of the Privacy Advisory Commission on May 3, 2021 of the use of the equipment on May 1, 2021. The report was discussed at the public May 5, 2021 PAC meeting.

In terms of an "analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology's use:"

- *data was not generated from use of the livestream transmitter as the transmission was not recorded; there is no data to analyze.*
- *Additionally, the technology is used to survey a large area for situational awareness. The administration burden would be high and challenging to determine the race of everyone who may have been streamed via the live video during even one usage over the course of an hour or more in an event with hundreds of people.*

For the reasons cited above, staff recommends that the PAC waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology's impact on privacy interests is outweighed by both the City's administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data

F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information:

The one use in 2021 was reviewed for adherence to policy and internal protocols:

- *Video was not recorded during the incident (see **Attachment A** for full report);*
- *Appropriate staff were notified of use and the City's Privacy Officer and PAC were notified according to policy.*
- *Technology was properly stored with the OPD Information Technology Unit (ITU).*
- *OPD is not aware of any policy violations from use of the live stream transmitters in 2021.*

G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response:

OPD is not aware of any data breaches; furthermore, data was not generated from use of the livestream transmitter as the transmission was not recorded.

H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes:

*The "Report on Video Stream Request and Usage," dated May 3, 201 (see **Attachment A**) explains that the decision to activate live stream and recording during the evening hours:*

- *Video Team assignments and equipment are a recommended if not required component of OPD response to planned events involving potentially large crowds.*
- *Live stream may be authorized by the Incident Commander.*
- *The march was reportedly organized or promoted by the same source linked to a April 16, 2021 march that resulted in numerous instances of property damage, arson, assault, and battery of police officers; the apparent organizers or participants of that event had refused to communicate with or otherwise cooperate with police*
- *The imagery used to promote the unpermitted march displayed burning structures with proximate protest activity inferring desired crimes of arson.*
- *The text used in this event's main social media/internet posting urged absences of livestreaming, picture taking, and "snitching" for an inferred intent to commit criminal acts with reduced chances of being identified and arrested.*
- *The text used in this event's main social media/internet posting was inherently anti-police and requested participants to "bring soup." Soup cans were thrown at officers with intent to injure during past anti-police demonstrations including the previously referenced 16 Apr 21 event.*
- *Open media sources had reported "antifa" communication and meetings in nearby Northern Ca communities identifying "May Day" as an opportunity to "kill cops." Persons affiliated with the "antifa" group(s) had ties to past Oakland events in which violence was used.*
- *The social media/internet posting urged persons to wear all black. "Black Blok" is a tactic in which persons desiring to commit unlawful acts wear black clothing so that they may not be easily identified or found within the crowd during or after committing criminal acts.*
- *The vast majority of persons assembled at Frank Ogawa Plaza arrived wearing all black.*
- *Many persons arriving at Frank Ogawa Plaza possessed bulky backpacks. Backpacks have been used to secret "tools of violence" and other instruments to damage property, commit acts of arson, or batter police officers.*
- *Officers observed a bag of canned soup brought to or possessed by persons assembling at Frank Ogawa Plaza.*
- *Attempts to communicate with the persons assembled in Frank Ogawa Plaza failed to achieve cooperation in establishing a march route, police liaison, and means by which criminal activity could be mitigated or otherwise cooperatively addressed.*
- *When persons assembled at Frank Ogawa Plaza entered the roadway with apparent intent to march, I authorized live stream and recording in order to better observe, plan, direct, and assess the crowd control incident in best effort to prevent, record, and address instances of property damage, arson, crime, and assaultive behavior.*

I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates:

There were no PRRs related to live stream transmitters in 2021.

J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year:

One hundred thirty thousand dollars (\$130,000) in one-time purchase cost. In 2021, OPD upgraded the video streaming system that was originally purchased in 2011. This included camera equipment, transmitters, receivers and software licensing.

K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request:

No requests for changes at this time.

OPD is committed to providing the best services to our community while being transparent and instilling procedural justice through daily police activity. This report is compliance with these OPD commitments. OPD hopes that this report helps to strengthen our trust within the Oakland community.

Respectfully submitted,

Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

Reviewed by,
Jeffrey Thomason, Lieutenant
OPD, Special Operations Section

Prepared by:
David Pullen, Officer
OPD, Bureau of Services, Information Technology Unit

Bruce Stoffmacher, Legislation and Privacy Manager
OPD, Research and Planning Unit

Attachments (1)
Appendix A: 2020 Video Stream Deployment Memos

CITY OF OAKLAND

Memorandum

TO: Privacy Advisory Commission and Chief Privacy Officer
FROM: Christopher Bolton, Deputy Chief of Police
DATE: May 3, 2021
RE: Report on Video Stream Request and Usage

This Memorandum summarizes the use of live-stream transmitters by the Oakland Police Department (OPD) in support of the specified event. This memorandum is provided in accordance with OPD Department General Order I-23: “Handheld Livestream Transmitter¹.”

Purpose (from DGO I-23)

Live stream camera transmitters allow OPD to deploy a minimal level of police presence while providing critical situational awareness to OPD commanders. A small number of officers can monitor events and provide real-time footage to Command. This information helps OPD Command to make efficient deployment decisions.

OPD commanders need real time situational awareness to ensure public safety in public spaces. Real-time information regarding events (e.g., crowd management facilitation, coordinated response to catastrophic unplanned events) provides critical information for OPD commanders when making resource deployment decisions. Authorized personnel utilizing cameras with live-streaming transmitters can provide important situational awareness to OPD without the need to deploy many officers.

Livestream Transmitter Use

The City of Oakland activated its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) on May 1, 2021 and, as part of the City’s Incident Command System response, OPD staffed the EOC positions therein including the role of OPD Operations Incident Command. The activation and associated operations were necessitated by the plan to address planned but unpermitted crowd management events associated to “May Day” parades, marches, rallies, demonstrations, protests and May 1st events. Although OPD deployed video teams with EOC video stream transmitters during the entire operational period, the technology use was limited to evening and late evening hours to better assess, plan, direct, and respond to circumstances associated with a march of approximately 70 persons. As the

¹ DGO I-23: Sec. III.B “Restricted Use,” Sec 4.ii: ii. For each use of live stream transmitters, OPD shall articulate the facts and circumstances surrounding the use in a written statement filed with the Chief Privacy Officer and/or Chair of the Privacy Advisory Commission within 72 hours. This statement (and the use itself) shall be included in the required Annual Report.

Attachment A - 2021 Surveillance Tech Annual Reports

Incident Commander, my decision to utilize video teams with streaming and recording² capabilities was based on numerous factors but driven by an overriding desire and mandate to videotape in a manner that minimizes interference with people lawfully participating in First Amendment activities. As evidence of this commitment, video stream was not utilized to record or display the actions of more than 150 persons during the peaceful car caravan and march early within the day. The below is a non-inclusive list of factors informing my decision to activate live stream and recording during the evening hours:

- Video Team assignments and equipment are a recommended if not required component of OPD response to planned events involving potentially large crowds.
- Live stream may be authorized by the Incident Commander.
- The march was reportedly organized or promoted by the same source linked to a April 16, 2021 march that resulted in numerous instances of property damage, arson, assault, and battery of police officers; the apparent organizers or participants of that event had refused to communicate with or otherwise cooperate with police/
- The imagery used to promote the unpermitted march displayed burning structures with proximate protest activity inferring desired crimes of arson.
- The text used in this event's main social media/internet posting urged absences of livestreaming, picture taking, and "snitching" for an inferred intent to commit criminal acts with reduced chances of being identified and arrested.
- The text used in this event's main social media/internet posting was inherently anti-police and requested participants to "bring soup." Soup cans were thrown at officers with intent to injure during past anti-police demonstrations including the previously referenced 16 Apr 21 event.
- Open media sources had reported "antifa" communication and meetings in nearby Northern Ca communities identifying "May Day" as an opportunity to "kill cops." Persons affiliated with the "antifa" group(s) had ties to past Oakland events in which violence was used.
- The social media/internet posting urged persons to wear all black. "Black Blok" is a tactic in which persons desiring to commit unlawful acts wear black clothing so that they may not be easily identified or found within the crowd during or after committing criminal acts.
- The vast majority of persons assembled at Frank Ogawa Plaza arrived wearing all black.
- Many persons arriving at Frank Ogawa Plaza possessed bulky backpacks. Backpacks have been used to secret "tools of violence" and other instruments to damage property, commit acts of arson, or batter police officers.

² In accordance with DGO I-23, IV.B Livestream Camera Data, "Retention,": Handheld live stream cameras can send the digital stream wirelessly. The EOC does not record this data; data recorded by the handheld cameras is maintained by the OPD IT Unit within in the Bureau of Services (BOS). Personnel using live-stream cameras shall return them at the end of their shift to the IT Unit. For data that is captured and used as evidence, such data shall be turned in and stored as evidence pursuant to existing policy. Otherwise, camera data will be destroyed after 30 days.

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- Officers observed a bag of canned soup brought to or possessed by persons assembling at Frank Ogawa Plaza.
- Attempts to communicate with the persons assembled in Frank Ogawa Plaza failed to achieve cooperation in establishing a march route, police liaison, and means by which criminal activity could be mitigated or otherwise cooperatively addressed.
- When persons assembled at Frank Ogawa Plaza entered the roadway with apparent intent to march, I authorized live stream and recording in order to better observe, plan, direct, and assess the crowd control incident in best effort to prevent, record, and address instances of property damage, arson, crime, and assaultive behavior.

RD# or Incident #: 21- 019659

Date of Incident: 1 May 21

Type of Event: Protest

Was EOC/DOC activated: YES

Number of Video Streams provide to EOC/DOC: 3 video streams.

Initial Request: Video Teams were requested by D.C. C. Bolton on 28 Apr 21.

Summary: On 1 May 21 at 2045 hrs. at the direction of D.C. C. Bolton, three video streams were provided by the Video Team to the EOC. The livestream ended at approximately 2230 hrs, when the demonstration ended.

Ann Pierce

Sergeant of Police

Bureau of Investigations

Oakland Police Department

Bruce Stoffmacher

Legislation and Privacy Manager

Research and Planning Section

Oakland Police Department

Oakland Police Department

Criminalistics Laboratory

Requests Completed Between 01 Jan 21 and 31 Dec 21

Unit FB

RD No	Lab No	Crime Type	No.	Analyst	Request	Assigned	Completed	Cancelled
01036278	17022	Sex Offense	1	EK	09/15/20	03/29/21	05/13/21	
01063412	17023	Sex Offense	1	EK	09/15/20	03/29/21	05/20/21	
02001819	17024	Rape	1	EK	09/16/20	03/29/21	05/20/21	
02043259	17025	Rape	1	EK	09/16/20	03/30/21	05/19/21	
02050483	17026	Rape	1	HW	09/16/20	03/30/21	05/20/21	
07026094	5128	Homicide	6	BC	12/08/20	12/09/20	01/14/21	
10023028	6974	Rape	3	CAG	10/14/21	10/22/21	12/30/21	
16031898	10693	Homicide	2	RJ	02/11/21	03/31/21	05/17/21	
16064685	11244	Homicide	4	CAG	04/21/21	04/21/21	05/07/21	
18023529	14166	SC Unexplained Death	3	AL	05/31/18	02/11/21	03/19/21	
18027499	12784	Rape	2	CAG	12/14/20	12/29/20	03/01/21	
18027646	17020	Robbery	2	EK	07/19/18	03/31/21	05/20/21	
18031763	12852	Assault	4	EK	06/28/18	03/31/21	05/20/21	
18033728	17021	Assault	2	NYN	07/11/18	04/01/21	05/20/21	
			3	NYN	08/03/18	04/01/21	05/20/21	
18038487	14949	Weapons	2	EK	08/09/18	03/31/21	05/19/21	
18042053	17058	Carjacking	1	RJ	10/11/18	03/31/21	05/24/21	
18043786	17059	Weapons	2	RJ	08/31/18	03/31/21	06/01/21	
18044586	15313	Robbery	2	SF	09/07/18	06/03/20	10/06/21	
18046211	17060	Other Criminal	4	SF	09/14/18	03/31/21	07/19/21	
18053409	13246	Assault	2	EK	03/07/19	03/31/21	04/29/21	
18055776	13318	Rape	3	HW	04/21/21	04/30/21	05/19/21	
18057757	13520	Homicide	16	HW	12/14/20	01/04/21	01/19/21	
18058849	17061	Robbery	2	SF	11/26/18	03/31/21	07/16/21	
18059648	13383	Homicide	5	RJ	12/06/18	10/29/20	01/29/21	
			7	RJ	12/10/18	10/29/20	01/29/21	
18059725	15124	Robbery	3	HW	11/29/18	02/22/21	05/19/21	
18060226	13421	Weapons	2	RJ	12/18/18	03/31/21	05/11/21	
19000506	13844	Assault	3	EK	07/29/19	05/21/21	10/13/21	
19002000	13664	Robbery	2	VSS	02/14/19	11/24/20	02/02/21	
19003036	17770	Weapons	2	AL	01/25/19	07/28/21	10/11/21	
19003137	13656	Rape	2	HW	01/15/21	01/19/21	02/10/21	
19006349	13634	Assault	3	SF	04/02/21	06/28/21	09/22/21	
19008265	17103	Assault	3	EK	02/25/19	04/05/21	04/29/21	

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RD No	Lab No	Crime Type	No.	Analyst	Request	Assigned	Completed	Cancelled
19010466	13706	Assault	2	SF	03/12/19	06/28/21	09/21/21	
19012016	17438	Robbery	4	NYN	03/14/19	05/21/21	08/06/21	
19016757	17340	Weapons	2	AL	04/05/19	05/06/21	06/15/21	
19019197	18017	Robbery	1	VSS	01/21/20	07/13/21	11/19/21	
19022636	14058	Weapons	1	RJ	05/07/19	03/31/21	05/18/21	
19023505	13988	Assault	3	EK	05/15/19	03/30/21	04/29/21	
19028136	17062	Weapons	3	EK	06/07/19	03/31/21	05/11/21	
19029659	17339	Robbery	2	AL	07/08/19	05/06/21	06/15/21	
19030801	17119	Weapons	4	EK	06/20/19	04/06/21	04/29/21	
19034391	14163	Assault	5	EK	07/09/19	03/30/21	04/29/21	
19037014	17846	Robbery	1	SF	07/31/19	08/10/21	10/18/21	
19038175	14227	Assault	3	EK	07/30/19	04/01/21	05/11/21	
19038270	17342	Carjacking	3	EK	07/30/19	05/12/21	06/14/21	
19039295	14221	Assault	2	CAG	08/08/19	04/29/21	07/29/21	
19040045	14953	Homicide	6	HW	02/03/21	02/03/21	04/05/21	
19042455	17290	Burglary	1	CAG	08/26/19	04/30/21	08/11/21	
19042647	16239	Weapons	2	CAG	08/20/19	10/21/20	01/11/21	
19043099	17094	Burglary	2	NYN	08/29/19	04/02/21	05/03/21	
19054375	14447	Robbery	3	EK	03/18/21	08/10/21	11/01/21	
19054399	17343	Sex Offense	1	EK	09/30/19	05/10/21	05/26/21	
19055593	17847	Weapons	1	EK	03/17/21	08/10/21	11/01/21	
19057039	16421	Burglary	1	RJ	11/05/19	11/24/20	01/15/21	
19057574	14479	Assault	2	VSS	11/08/19	03/12/21	04/15/21	
19058068	14485	Assault	1	VSS	11/07/19	03/12/21	04/15/21	
19058600	14504	Homicide	8	CAG	11/19/19	07/23/21	08/11/21	
19058976	15984	Homicide	3	CAG	11/14/19	03/15/21	05/12/21	
19059950	15985	Auto Theft	3	AL	11/21/19	06/07/21	07/09/21	
19060095	14541	Assault	3	AL	04/21/20	06/14/21	07/21/21	
19061640	16420	Robbery	1	VSS	11/26/19	11/24/20	02/08/21	
19062872	16619	Assault	1	AL	12/05/19	12/28/20	02/02/21	
19062955	15400	Weapons	2	SF	12/26/19	04/28/21	07/26/21	
19064132	17848	Robbery	2	HW	12/13/19	08/10/21	10/08/21	
19065714	14686	Rape	2	HW	01/27/21	02/04/21	03/17/21	
19065941	16896	Weapons	1	SF	12/23/19	03/01/21	05/20/21	
19066709	14997	Homicide	2	BC	09/29/21	10/06/21	12/08/21	
19067532	16897	Burglary	1	HW	01/21/20	02/24/21	04/26/21	
20000169	17631	Burglary	1	EK	01/21/20	07/06/21	08/10/21	
20000444	16354	Weapons	4	SF	03/10/21	07/07/21	10/07/21	
20000448	17070	Weapons	1	NYN	01/15/20	03/31/21	05/03/21	

Attachment A: OPD Surveillance Unit 2021 Annual Reports**Unit FB**

RD No	Lab No	Crime Type	No.	Analyst	Request	Assigned	Completed	Cancelled
20000449	17148	Weapons	1	NYN	01/15/20	04/09/21	05/11/21	
20000555	17632	Burglary	1	SF	01/15/20	07/07/21	10/04/21	
20001193	17633	Robbery	1	SF	01/21/20	07/07/21	09/13/21	
20002337	17808	Robbery	1	AL	01/14/20	08/26/21	10/11/21	
20002670	14720	Assault	2	AL	01/16/20	08/26/21	10/11/21	
20003256	17856	Burglary	1	SF	01/27/20	08/06/21	10/11/21	
20003406	14910	Hit and Run	2	VSS	04/13/21	04/20/21	05/17/21	
20003526	17849	Assault	3	EK	01/22/20	08/10/21	10/08/21	
20005624	17920	Burglary	1	EK	02/20/20	08/19/21	10/15/21	
20005838	15204	Rape	3	HW	12/23/20	02/18/21	03/10/21	
20010157	15327	Rape	3	AL	10/13/20	10/19/20	01/14/21	
20011135	17921	Assault	2	SF	03/06/20	08/18/21	12/03/21	
20011754	17079	Robbery	1	EK	08/17/20	04/01/21	04/29/21	
20012506	14850	Weapons	3	EK	03/30/20	04/01/21	04/29/21	
20013312	16355	Robbery	1	RJ	04/15/20	11/10/20	02/19/21	
20014597	17086	Assault	1	EK	03/26/20	04/05/21	05/13/21	
20014820	17380	Homicide	1	AL	05/10/21	05/24/21	07/13/21	
20016868	15010	Weapons	2	SF	03/31/20	05/19/21	07/26/21	
20018666	15160	Assault	1	NYN	04/17/20	05/26/21	08/12/21	
20019001	15279	Homicide	3	SF	04/28/20	08/31/20	04/22/21	
20019026	15926	Robbery	1	SF	04/15/20	08/31/20	03/24/21	
20019050	16512	Weapons	2	HW	04/30/20	12/11/20	01/04/21	
20019088	15110	Assault	3	AL	04/16/20	03/24/21	05/27/21	
20019684	15478	Rape	2	HW	06/16/20	10/27/20	01/04/21	
20019806	16683	Weapons	2	HW	01/19/21	02/16/21	03/19/21	
20020312	15139	Homicide	3	CAG	04/24/20	09/01/21	12/06/21	
20020603	15229	Weapons	2	NYN	05/11/20	05/26/21	07/26/21	
20020660	15140	Weapons	2	SF	04/24/20	09/08/21	11/18/21	
20021531	15173	Assault	3	NYN	04/30/20	03/30/21	05/14/21	
20022305	15332	Sex Offense	2	CAG	05/28/20	11/09/20	03/03/21	
20022757	16881	Carjacking	2	CAG	05/26/20	06/09/21	09/23/21	
20023314	16401	Carjacking	2	VSS	09/23/20	11/19/20	02/19/21	
20025235	17344	Weapons	1	EK	05/26/20	05/10/21	06/14/21	
20025284	15927	Burglary	3	SF	10/19/20	12/07/20	02/09/21	
20026062	17056	Robbery	1	NYN	05/28/20	03/31/21	05/20/21	
20026824	15672	Homicide	3	HW	07/27/20	11/23/20	01/26/21	
20028070	16228	Rape	1	RJ	10/14/20	10/19/20	01/24/21	
20029650	15441	Homicide	3	SF	07/06/20	06/28/21	09/08/21	
20029732	15414	Other Person	1	VSS	06/22/20	07/03/20	02/16/21	

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RD No	Lab No	Crime Type	No.	Analyst	Request	Assigned	Completed	Cancelled
20030227	15803	Rape	1	SF	08/04/20	08/11/20	05/21/21	
20031564	17012	Carjacking	1	VSS	07/22/20	03/25/21	05/13/21	
20033467	16423	Robbery	2	VSS	07/09/20	11/24/20	02/11/21	
20034591	17418	Assault	3	SF	07/16/20	05/18/21	07/23/21	
20035047	15922	Homicide	3	HW	12/07/20	02/16/21	03/19/21	
20035129	17533	Robbery	2	AL	07/22/20	06/14/21	09/02/21	
20035334	15665	Assault	4	HW	07/21/20	09/17/20	01/06/21	
20035880	15859	Sex Offense	2	HW	07/23/20	10/27/20	01/15/21	
20036082	17527	Weapons	2	CAG	07/24/20	06/09/21	09/20/21	
20037924	16164	Homicide	1	AL	08/05/20	10/05/20	01/20/21	
20038059	17439	Assault	2	CAG	08/04/20	05/24/21	08/19/21	
20038267	15801	Sex Offense	1	VSS	08/05/20	08/11/20	01/15/21	
20038278	15856	Sex Offense	3	HW	01/25/21	01/27/21	03/17/21	
20038696	15879	Attempted Murder	3	AL	11/12/21	12/13/21	12/17/21	
20038766	16403	Attempted Murder	1	HW	10/19/20	11/23/20	01/25/21	
20039000	16296	Robbery	1	RJ	09/03/20	10/29/20	01/04/21	
20039247	15855	Rape	1	SF	08/10/20	08/17/20	01/06/21	
20039558	16231	Rape	1	AL	10/14/20	10/19/20	01/08/21	
			2	HW	10/14/20	11/24/20	01/29/21	
20040117	16425	Assault	1	CAG	08/24/20	11/24/20	03/04/21	
20040194	15972	Rape	1	VSS	09/01/20	09/10/20	05/14/21	
20040600	15920	Weapons	3	SF	09/14/20	12/07/20	04/13/21	
20041076	16404	Rape	1	HW	11/19/20	11/24/20	03/10/21	
20041152	16269	Rape	1	CAG	10/16/20	10/28/20	04/02/21	
20041255	15907	Weapons	2	RJ	08/24/20	03/23/21	06/30/21	
20041382	16298	Sex Offense	1	RJ	10/27/20	10/29/20	02/11/21	
20041824	16165	Assault	1	CAG	09/15/20	10/05/20	01/28/21	
20042634	15993	Rape	1	SF	09/03/20	09/15/20	01/15/21	
			2	SF	07/15/21	07/22/21	10/08/21	
20043707	15967	Attempted Murder	2	SF	09/10/20	12/07/20	03/24/21	
20043942	15995	Rape	1	SF	09/08/20	09/15/20	03/19/21	
20043956	15983	Assault	2	CAG	09/08/20	11/12/20	01/22/21	
20044529	16144	Rape	1	CAG	09/29/20	10/05/20	01/06/21	
20044704	16229	Assault	1	AL	10/14/20	10/19/20	01/08/21	
20045598	17345	Weapons	3	AL	12/10/20	06/15/21	07/27/21	
20045789	16074	Assault	3	HW	09/24/20	11/24/20	02/22/21	
20046588	16153	Rape	1	AL	09/25/20	10/12/20	01/08/21	
20046726	16230	Rape	1	AL	10/14/20	10/19/20	01/20/21	
20047237	16154	Rape	1	HW	09/30/20	10/12/20	01/15/21	

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RD No	Lab No	Crime Type	No.	Analyst	Request	Assigned	Completed	Cancelled
20047624	16126	Robbery	2	HW	10/19/20	10/27/20	01/06/21	
20047706	16388	Homicide	3	VSS	10/21/20	11/17/20	02/08/21	
20047859	16299	Rape	1	CAG	10/27/20	10/29/20	01/06/21	
20047977	16271	Rape	1	HW	10/21/20	10/28/20	02/08/21	
20048007	16272	Homicide	4	SF	09/01/21	09/27/21	12/13/21	
20048034	16405	Attempted Murder	1	HW	09/22/20	11/24/20	01/29/21	
20048227	16241	Homicide	3	RJ	10/19/20	11/17/20	02/08/21	
20048319	16204	Homicide	1	VSS	10/05/20	10/13/20	02/09/21	
20048495	16422	Assault	1	CAG	10/02/20	11/24/20	02/10/21	
20048886	16291	Assault	2	CAG	10/15/20	11/10/20	01/22/21	
20048907	16202	Homicide	4	VSS	10/26/20	01/15/21	01/27/21	
			6	VSS	11/23/20	12/17/20	01/19/21	
20049373	17742	Homicide	2	AL	10/13/20	07/26/21	10/01/21	
20049517	16337	Rape	1	SF	11/04/20	11/09/20	01/06/21	
20049588	16301	Rape	1	CAG	10/27/20	10/29/20	03/29/21	
20049971	16365	Assault	1	RJ	11/03/20	11/12/20	03/19/21	
20050051	16275	Rape	1	HW	10/14/20	10/28/20	01/04/21	
			2	HW	10/14/20	11/24/20	01/04/21	
20050187	16302	Other Person	1	RJ	10/27/20	10/29/20	01/15/21	
			2	RJ	06/09/21	06/09/21	07/16/21	
20050314	16276	Rape	1	HW	10/21/20	10/28/20	01/08/21	
20050759	16419	Homicide	1	RJ	10/29/20	11/24/20	02/08/21	
20050946	16338	Rape	1	RJ	11/05/20	11/09/20	01/29/21	
20050969	16294	Homicide	3	HW	10/21/20	12/09/20	02/26/21	
			6	HW	11/16/20	08/11/21	10/08/21	
			7	HW	01/04/21	01/05/21	02/26/21	
20051169	16432	Assault	4	NYN	11/12/20	06/18/21	08/12/21	
20051358	16250	Assault	2	CAG	10/21/20	11/24/20	03/04/21	
20051397	16554	Homicide	2	SF	11/16/20	12/15/20	02/11/21	
20051805	16321	Assault	3	CAG	11/16/20	02/04/21	03/24/21	
20051860	16681	Sex Offense	1	RJ	01/05/21	01/08/21	03/01/21	
			2	HW	01/05/21	02/18/21	03/29/21	
20052507	16406	Homicide	3	HW	11/03/20	11/24/20	02/08/21	
20052551	16326	Assault	2	CAG	11/02/20	12/07/20	03/01/21	
20052825	16627	Homicide	1	HW	12/28/20	01/05/21	02/10/21	
20052863	16339	Rape	1	SF	10/28/20	11/09/20	01/06/21	
			2	CAG	10/28/20	01/19/21	05/11/21	
20052901	16409	Homicide	2	VSS	10/29/20	11/20/20	01/25/21	
20053306	16581	Rape	1	CAG	12/09/20	12/21/20	03/22/21	

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RD No	Lab No	Crime Type	No.	Analyst	Request	Assigned	Completed	Cancelled
20053392	17011	Robbery	3	VSS	11/09/20	03/25/21	05/07/21	
20053459	16398	Rape	1	RJ	11/12/20	11/18/20	01/29/21	
20053480	16767	Homicide	2	CAG	11/19/20	02/01/21	04/19/21	
20053606	16659	Rape	1	RJ	12/23/20	01/08/21	03/01/21	
20053624	16370	Homicide	3	NYN	02/24/21	03/31/21	05/14/21	
20053646	16596	Sex Offense	1	CAG	12/09/20	12/23/20	03/26/21	
20053666	16340	Sex Offense	1	SF	11/05/20	11/09/20	01/06/21	
			2	CAG	11/05/20	01/19/21	05/11/21	
20054210	17010	Homicide	2	AL	11/18/20	03/25/21	05/21/21	
20054745	16693	Homicide	4	HW	01/06/21	02/16/21	02/25/21	
20054927	16625	Sex Offense	1	AL	12/04/20	01/27/21	03/19/21	
20055028	18264	Homicide	1	CAG	11/16/20	10/19/21	12/15/21	
20055058	16399	Rape	2	RJ	11/12/20	11/19/20	01/14/21	
20055306	17923	Homicide	2	EK	03/19/21	08/18/21	10/15/21	
20055519	16395	Attempted Murder	2	HW	11/12/20	11/18/20	03/01/21	
20055785	16626	Sex Offense	1	AL	12/08/20	12/30/20	06/18/21	
20055980	16624	Rape	1	CAG	12/08/20	12/29/20	05/05/21	
20056351	16407	Rape	1	HW	11/18/20	11/25/20	02/16/21	
20056415	16490	Sex Offense	1	HW	12/04/20	12/07/20	02/04/21	
20056695	16868	Carjacking	2	HW	11/19/20	02/22/21	04/26/21	
20056752	16618	Assault	2	AL	11/19/20	12/28/20	02/10/21	
20056868	16555	Homicide	2	AL	11/23/20	01/11/21	02/02/21	
20057045	16556	Homicide	3	SF	11/23/20	12/16/20	01/19/21	
20057648	16491	Rape	1	HW	12/03/20	12/07/20	02/09/21	
20058685	16658	Robbery	2	HW	12/17/20	01/08/21	02/10/21	
20058691	16492	Rape	1	HW	12/03/20	12/07/20	02/19/21	
			3	HW	12/03/20	01/11/21	02/19/21	
20058808	16864	Attempted Murder	2	HW	12/09/20	02/22/21	04/26/21	
20059087	16571	Homicide	2	VSS	12/18/20	12/18/20	02/02/21	
20059088	16680	Rape	1	RJ	12/31/20	01/08/21	03/01/21	
20059133	16834	Homicide	1	HW	01/13/21	02/16/21	04/14/21	
			2	HW	01/29/21	02/16/21	04/14/21	
20059903	16553	Assault	1	AL	12/08/20	01/11/21	01/22/21	
20060041	16865	Hit and Run	1	AL	01/19/21	02/22/21	05/07/21	
20060055	16917	Homicide	6	HW	12/16/20	03/01/21	04/20/21	
			7	HW	12/17/20	03/01/21	04/20/21	
			8	HW	02/25/21	03/01/21	04/20/21	
			9	HW	12/17/20	08/18/21	08/31/21	
			11	HW	03/25/21	03/31/21	04/19/21	

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RD No	Lab No	Crime Type	No.	Analyst	Request	Assigned	Completed	Cancelled
20060158	17102	Weapons	2	NYN	12/10/20	04/02/21	05/03/21	
20060239	16642	Robbery	1	HW	12/23/20	01/06/21	02/09/21	
20060260	16660	Rape	1	HW	12/28/20	01/08/21	03/17/21	
20060346	17087	Assault	3	NYN	12/10/20	04/02/21	05/03/21	
20060412	17924	Assault	2	SF	03/19/21	08/18/21	12/03/21	
20060927	16662	Rape	1	AL	12/30/20	01/27/21	02/10/21	
20061418	16663	Rape	1	CAG	12/30/20	01/08/21	03/29/21	
			2	CAG	12/30/20	02/02/21	03/29/21	
20061565	16866	Homicide	3	HW	01/15/21	02/22/21	04/28/21	
20061583	16661	Rape	1	RJ	12/29/20	01/08/21	02/10/21	
20063716	17337	Assault	3	AL	01/06/21	05/06/21	06/15/21	
20063910	17346	Assault	3	AL	01/05/21	06/15/21	07/23/21	
200905	17288	Other Criminal	1	VSS	04/21/21	05/05/21	07/21/21	
			4	VSS	05/06/21	05/05/21	07/21/21	
21000009	16835	Homicide	3	HW	01/05/21	02/17/21	04/27/21	
			4	HW	02/09/21	02/17/21	04/27/21	
21000316	16691	Rape	1	SF	01/13/21	01/19/21	06/10/21	
21000541	17491	Weapons	3	SF	01/06/21	05/27/21	07/26/21	
21000730	16682	Sex Offense	1	RJ	01/06/21	01/08/21	03/01/21	
21000830	17634	Robbery	1	SF	03/31/21	07/07/21	10/13/21	
21000838	16667	Attempted Murder	1	HW	01/08/21	01/11/21	02/10/21	
			4	SF	03/31/21	07/07/21	09/23/21	
21000916	16845	Robbery	1	HW	02/11/21	02/17/21	03/17/21	
21001005	16698	Rape	1	SF	01/14/21	01/19/21	05/19/21	
21001493	17635	Homicide	1	EK	03/23/21	07/01/21	08/10/21	
21001658	16699	Rape	1	SF	01/14/21	01/19/21	03/19/21	
21001836	16739	Rape	1	VSS	01/21/21	01/27/21	04/12/21	
21002016	16738	Rape	1	VSS	01/19/21	01/27/21	04/14/21	
21002065	16826	Rape	1	AL	02/03/21	02/10/21	04/13/21	
21002412	16836	Homicide	1	HW	02/03/21	02/17/21	03/19/21	
21002569	16740	Homicide	1	VSS	01/21/21	01/27/21	03/17/21	
21002579	16846	Homicide	2	HW	02/09/21	02/17/21	03/19/21	
21002737	16793	Sex Offense	1	CAG	01/27/21	02/03/21	03/29/21	
21002740	16707	Homicide	1	HW	01/20/21	01/21/21	03/24/21	
21002803	16766	Rape	1	CAG	01/27/21	02/01/21	03/17/21	
21002982	16776	Sex Offense	1	CAG	01/28/21	02/02/21	05/11/21	
			2	CAG	06/15/21	06/15/21	09/02/21	
21003060	16825	Sex Offense	1	SF	01/29/21	02/10/21	04/12/21	
21003120	16757	Weapons	1	VSS	01/21/21	01/27/21	03/18/21	

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RD No	Lab No	Crime Type	No.	Analyst	Request	Assigned	Completed	Cancelled
21003728	16847	Weapons	2	HW	02/09/21	02/17/21	03/19/21	
21004076	17167	Assault	3	SF	02/08/21	04/13/21	06/22/21	
21004492	17168	Robbery	1	HW	02/03/21	04/13/21	06/09/21	
21005104	16824	Rape	1	SF	02/04/21	02/10/21	04/12/21	
21005639	16816	Weapons	4	NYN	02/16/21	03/30/21	05/14/21	
21005660	16863	Sex Offense	1	RJ	02/17/21	02/22/21	04/16/21	
21005856	16837	Rape	1	HW	02/09/21	02/18/21	04/14/21	
21007263	16985	Homicide	2	AL	03/16/21	03/25/21	05/10/21	
21007420	16999	Homicide	2	AL	03/12/21	05/07/21	08/10/21	
21007564	17169	Robbery	1	CAG	02/18/21	04/13/21	09/21/21	
21007594	17516	Weapons	2	CAG	03/29/21	09/03/21	12/13/21	
21007965	16961	Rape	1	VSS	03/04/21	03/09/21	04/30/21	
			2	VSS	04/06/21	04/07/21	05/07/21	
			3	VSS	07/20/21	07/20/21	09/08/21	
21008014	16960	Sex Offense	1	VSS	02/25/21	03/09/21	04/20/21	
21008066	16975	Sex Offense	1	CAG	03/10/21	03/15/21	06/28/21	
21008400	17347	Homicide	3	EK	03/01/21	05/12/21	06/15/21	
21008563	17000	Rape	1	AL	03/16/21	03/23/21	05/13/21	
21008884	17420	Homicide	3	SF	03/01/21	06/30/21	09/30/21	
21008893	17170	Homicide	2	HW	03/01/21	04/12/21	05/20/21	
21008933	16916	Homicide	1	SF	02/26/21	03/01/21	05/07/21	
			2	RJ	04/07/21	04/07/21	05/07/21	
			3	SF	04/27/21	04/27/21	05/07/21	
21009245	16986	Assault	1	CAG	03/10/21	03/15/21	06/25/21	
21009400	16976	Sex Offense	1	CAG	03/09/21	03/15/21	05/24/21	
21010069	16964	Attempted Murder	1	SF	03/04/21	03/10/21	05/14/21	
21010282	16962	Sex Offense	1	VSS	03/08/21	03/09/21	07/02/21	
			2	VSS	03/10/21	03/10/21	07/02/21	
21010400	17027	Sex Offense	1	NYN	03/24/21	03/30/21	05/13/21	
21011730	17028	Rape	1	NYN	03/24/21	03/30/21	05/14/21	
21012113	17063	Homicide	2	EK	03/23/21	07/06/21	07/27/21	
			3	EK	06/15/21	07/06/21	07/27/21	
21012315	17636	Attempted Murder	3	EK	03/23/21	07/06/21	07/27/21	
21012352	17001	Sex Offense	1	AL	03/22/21	03/23/21	05/13/21	
21012686	17133	Homicide	3	SF	04/02/21	04/12/21	07/07/21	
			4	SF	04/08/21	04/12/21	07/07/21	
21012826	17465	Assault	2	SF	03/26/21	05/25/21	07/16/21	
21012836	17044	Attempted Murder	2	CAG	03/25/21	07/23/21	09/23/21	
21012839	17211	Sex Offense	1	VSS	04/15/21	04/20/21	08/25/21	

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RD No	Lab No	Crime Type	No.	Analyst	Request	Assigned	Completed	Cancelled
21013292	17033	Attempted Murder	3	SF	05/27/21	07/22/21	11/01/21	
21013311	17132	Sex Offense	1	RJ	04/01/21	04/02/21	05/24/21	
			2	RJ	04/08/21	04/08/21	05/24/21	
21013351	17214	Homicide	4	SF	04/14/21	06/09/21	07/23/21	
			5	SF	04/22/21	06/09/21	07/23/21	
21013825	17427	Sex Offense	1	SF	05/12/21	05/19/21	07/28/21	
			2	SF	05/12/21	05/19/21	07/28/21	
21015947	17192	Homicide	1	AL	04/12/21	07/28/21	11/19/21	
21016024	17251	Sex Offense	1	CAG	04/14/21	04/26/21	06/11/21	
21016026	17315	Homicide	2	AL	04/29/21	05/04/21	07/09/21	
21016247	17196	Homicide	1	NYN	04/12/21	08/04/21	10/27/21	
21016388	17348	Rape	1	EK	05/04/21	05/13/21	06/15/21	
21016434	17351	Homicide	2	EK	05/06/21	05/10/21	05/25/21	
21016758	17260	Rape	1	CAG	04/22/21	04/27/21	06/25/21	
21016959	17261	Rape	1	CAG	04/21/21	04/27/21	06/18/21	
21017651	17317	Homicide	2	AL	04/23/21	05/04/21	06/04/21	
21017862	17269	Sex Offense	1	SF	04/21/21	04/28/21	07/19/21	
			2	SF	07/26/21	08/06/21	12/09/21	
21018029	17293	Rape	1	NYN	04/29/21	05/03/21	07/13/21	
21018445	17349	Burglary	1	EK	05/03/21	05/13/21	06/14/21	
			2	VSS	05/24/21	05/26/21	08/06/21	
21019226	17350	Rape	1	EK	05/06/21	05/13/21	06/15/21	
21019256	17430	Burglary	3	VSS	05/21/21	05/26/21	08/10/21	
21019404	17428	Rape	1	NYN	05/07/21	05/20/21	06/16/21	
21019875	17429	Rape	1	NYN	05/10/21	05/20/21	09/20/21	
21020232	17464	Sex Offense	1	SF	05/17/21	05/24/21	07/21/21	
21020353	17463	Rape	1	SF	05/12/21	05/24/21	07/27/21	
21020428	17481	Rape	1	VSS	05/26/21	05/26/21	09/03/21	
21020752	18291	Weapons	2	CAG	03/11/21	10/20/21	12/06/21	
21021725	17702		1	VSS	06/24/21	07/13/21	08/17/21	
21021747	17925	Rape	1	EK	08/06/21	08/16/21	10/14/21	
21022351	17472	Rape	1	SF	05/19/21	05/26/21	06/24/21	
21022361	17482	Rape	1	VSS	05/20/21	05/26/21	08/10/21	
			2	VSS	07/07/21	07/14/21	09/20/21	
21022554	17675	Sex Offense	1	EK	06/30/21	07/08/21	08/16/21	
21023021	17926	Homicide	1	EK	06/22/21	08/19/21	10/15/21	
21023596	17565	Rape	1	NYN	06/16/21	06/24/21	09/24/21	
21023657	17480	Sex Offense	1	VSS	05/25/21	06/10/21	07/21/21	
			4	VSS	05/26/21	05/26/21	07/21/21	

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RD No	Lab No	Crime Type	No.	Analyst	Request	Assigned	Completed	Cancelled
21023657	17480	Sex Offense	6	VSS	05/27/21	06/10/21	07/21/21	
21023776	17541	Homicide	1	AL	06/04/21	06/14/21	07/16/21	
			4	AL	08/09/21	08/11/21	10/27/21	
21023806	17556	Homicide	2	NYN	06/04/21	06/17/21	06/29/21	
21023847	17519	Rape	1	EK	05/28/21	06/08/21	09/13/21	
21024105	17696	Homicide	1	VSS	06/21/21	07/14/21	09/02/21	
			5	VSS	07/07/21	07/14/21	09/02/21	
21024541	17927	Rape	1	SF	08/12/21	08/16/21	11/19/21	
21024587	17703	Weapons	1	VSS	06/24/21	07/13/21	08/18/21	
21024838	17566	Sex Offense	1	NYN	06/17/21	06/25/21	07/26/21	
			2	NYN	06/17/21	08/06/21	10/13/21	
21025136	17602	Carjacking	2	SF	06/08/21	06/28/21	07/26/21	
			4	SF	06/24/21	06/28/21	06/29/21	
21025432	17611	Weapons	1	SF	06/04/21	06/29/21	09/22/21	
21025640	18016	Other Person	1	SF	06/10/21	08/27/21	12/03/21	
21025834	17557	Rape	1	NYN	06/10/21	06/24/21	09/20/21	
			3	NYN	07/13/21	07/15/21	09/20/21	
21026602	18025	Sex Offense	1	CAG	08/26/21	08/31/21	12/01/21	
21027249	17601	Sex Offense	1	SF	06/16/21	06/25/21	09/20/21	
21027433	17676	Rape	1	EK	06/30/21	07/08/21	08/16/21	
21027774	17853	Rape	1	SF	08/03/21	08/09/21	10/18/21	
21028801	17677	Sex Offense	1	SF	06/30/21	07/19/21	10/08/21	
21029048	17852	Rape	1	SF	08/03/21	08/09/21	10/14/21	
21029061	17750	Sex Offense	1	AL	07/06/21	07/26/21	10/04/21	
21029125	17721	Sex Offense	1	SF	07/06/21	07/19/21	11/01/21	
21029353	17715	Rape	1	VSS	07/01/21	07/16/21	09/29/21	
21029534	17855	Carjacking	2	SF	07/27/21	08/09/21	12/15/21	
21029908	17851	Kidnapping	3	AL	08/05/21	08/25/21	09/23/21	
21030018	17729	Rape	1	SF	07/06/21	07/23/21	10/06/21	
21030055	17741	Sex Offense	1	SF	07/14/21	07/22/21	09/23/21	
21030348	17850	Attempted Murder	1	SF	07/06/21	08/11/21	12/13/21	
21030428	17929	Rape	1	EK	08/05/21	08/17/21	12/27/21	
21032011	17704	Homicide	1	VSS	07/13/21	07/14/21	08/17/21	
21032314	17752	Rape	1	NYN	07/19/21	07/26/21	12/01/21	
21032706	17757	Rape	1	AL	07/15/21	07/28/21	09/03/21	
21032766	17809	Homicide	1	NYN	07/20/21	08/04/21	11/01/21	
			3	NYN	09/07/21	09/16/21	11/01/21	
21032767	17810	Homicide	2	NYN	07/20/21	08/06/21	10/08/21	
21033192	17836	Rape	1	NYN	07/26/21	08/05/21	10/05/21	

Attachment A: ~~OPD~~ Surveillance Unit 2021 Annual Reports

Unit FB

RD No	Lab No	Crime Type	No.	Analyst	Request	Assigned	Completed	Cancelled
21033238	17854	Rape	1	EK	08/03/21	08/09/21	10/14/21	
21033732	17837	Rape	1	NYN	07/21/21	08/05/21	10/08/21	
21035260	18024	Assault	1	CAG	08/13/21	08/30/21	11/05/21	
21036286	17965	Homicide	1	VSS	08/11/21	08/25/21	12/15/21	
21036524	18034	Sex Offense	1	CAG	08/12/21	09/01/21	12/13/21	
			2	CAG	09/02/21	09/03/21	12/13/21	
21036648	18035	Sex Offense	1	CAG	08/12/21	09/01/21	12/01/21	
21036778	17994	Rape	1	VSS	08/13/21	08/24/21	10/13/21	
21036830	17997	Sex Offense	1	VSS	08/13/21	08/24/21	12/30/21	
			2	VSS	08/24/21	08/24/21	12/30/21	
21038078	18058	Rape	1	SF	08/26/21	09/03/21	12/13/21	
21038138	18072	Rape	1	EK	08/30/21	09/07/21	12/30/21	
21038518	17975	Homicide	2	HW	08/23/21	08/25/21	10/13/21	
21039365	18164	Sex Offense	1	NYN	08/26/21	09/22/21	12/23/21	
21039732	18064	Sex Offense	1	CAG	08/26/21	09/03/21	11/19/21	
21039816	18043	Officer Involved	2	CAG	08/31/21	09/20/21	12/22/21	
21039881	18074	Rape	1	AL	08/30/21	09/07/21	10/14/21	
21039973	18161	Rape	1	SF	09/08/21	09/21/21	12/06/21	
21040919	18192	Rape	1	SF	09/02/21	09/27/21	12/13/21	
21041052	18076	Homicide	3	AL	09/03/21	09/08/21	10/13/21	
21045076	18342	Homicide	1	HW	11/05/21	11/08/21	12/07/21	
21046897	18241	Rape	1	HW	10/08/21	10/08/21	10/29/21	
21049455	18292	Attempted Murder	2	CAG	10/22/21	10/22/21	12/09/21	
			6	SF	11/01/21	11/02/21	12/08/21	
			7	SF	11/01/21	11/02/21	12/08/21	
			8	SF	11/03/21	11/03/21	12/08/21	
			10	CAG	11/22/21	11/23/21	12/30/21	
21051405	18341	Assault	1	HW	11/05/21	11/08/21	12/17/21	
70054254	16965	Cold Case	2	VSS	02/29/12	04/21/21	09/29/21	
84007346	17057	Homicide	2	RJ	02/17/21	03/31/21	05/17/21	
90080996	17188	Rape	1	SF	09/25/20	04/15/21	06/29/21	
90111076	17453	Rape	1	SF	09/25/20	05/24/21	08/05/21	
91004254	17189	Rape	1	CAG	08/27/20	04/15/21	06/28/21	
91025384	17190	Rape	1	SF	08/27/20	04/15/21	06/29/21	
91032319	17191	Rape	1	AL	09/01/20	06/08/21	06/23/21	
91049814	17234	Rape	1	VSS	09/25/20	04/22/21	05/26/21	
91100433	17294	Rape	1	AL	09/29/20	05/03/21	06/02/21	
91116792	17233	Rape	1	VSS	09/29/20	04/22/21	05/24/21	
91133790	17295	Rape	1	AL	09/01/20	05/03/21	06/11/21	

Unit FB

RD No	Lab No	Crime Type	No.	Analyst	Request	Assigned	Completed	Cancelled
91138313	17296	Rape	1	AL	09/01/20	05/03/21	06/03/21	
93115065	17341	Rape	1	EK	09/02/20	06/08/21	09/08/21	
94087483	16402	Homicide	1	HW	11/03/20	11/23/20	02/09/21	
95065901	17525	Rape	1	CAG	09/02/20	06/08/21	08/09/21	
97098610	17963	Rape	1	EK	09/03/20	08/19/21	10/15/21	
98079335	16501	Cold Case	1	SF	10/27/20	12/07/20	04/13/21	

430 requests for 218 new cases completed.

430 requests and 218 new cases completed.